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Abstract
Bayesianism, in its traditional form, consists of two claims about rational cre-
dences. According to the first claim, probabilism, rational credences form a prob-
ability function. According to the second claim, conditionalization, rational cre-
dences update by conditionalizing on new evidence. The simplicity and elegance
of classical Bayesianism make it an attractive view. But many have argued that this
simplicity comes at a cost: that it requires too many idealizations.
This thesis aims to provide a justification of classical Bayesianism. Chapter
One defends probabilism, classically understood, against the charge that by requir-
ing credences to be precise real numbers, classical Bayesianism is committed to
an overly precise conception of evidence. Chapter Two defends conditionalization,
classically understood, against the charge that epistemic rationality consists only of
synchronic norms. Chapter Three defends both probabilism and conditionalization
against the objection that they require us, in some circumstances, to have credences
that we can know are not as close to the truth as alternatives that violate Bayesian
norms.
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Title: Professor of Philosophy
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Introduction
Bayesianism, in its traditional form, consists of two claims about rational cre-
dences. According to the first claim, probabilism, rational credences have a par-
ticular mathematical structure at each point in time: they form a probability func-
tion. According to the second claim, conditionalization, rational credences are
interrelated in a particular way over time: they update by conditionalizing on new
evidence.
The simplicity and elegance of classical Bayesianism make it an attractive view.
But many have argued that this simplicity comes at a cost: that it requires too much
idealization. One objection claims that by requiring credences to be precise real
numbers, classical Bayesianism ignores the fact that our evidence is messy and im-
precise. Another objection claims that our credences should only be constrained
by evidence available at the present, and so seeks to unseat cross-temporal con-
straints like conditionalization. Finally, a third objection claims that rational cre-
dences must approximate the truth, and both probabilism and conditionalization
will sometimes require agents to have credences that are predictably farther from
the truth than non-probabilistic or non-conditionalized alternatives.
This thesis aims to provide a justification of classical Bayesianism against each
of these challenges.
Chapter One offers a defense of probabilism, classically understood. Some
philosophers claim that, in response to ambiguous or unspecific evidence, ratio-
nality requires adopting imprecise credences: degrees of belief that are spread out
over multiple real numbers. Otherwise, on this view, one's credences would take
an inappropriately definite stance on the basis of indefinite evidence. I argue that
these views conflate two kinds of states: the state of having a precise credence in
a proposition, and the state of having a belief about that proposition's objective or
epistemic probability. With this distinction in hand, there are a variety of positions
open to the defender of precise credences that are all compatible with the idea that
evidence can be unspecific or ambiguous.
Chapter Two offers a defense of conditionalization, classically understood. In
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recent years it's often been argued that the norms of rationality only apply to agents
at a time; there are no diachronic constraints on rationality. Some have claimed
that we should replace conditionalization, a diachronic norm, with some similar
norm that only requires us to constrain our credences to the evidence that is cur-
rently accessible to us. I show that abandoning diachronic norms incurs serious
costs for a theory of rationality, and I argue that the motivations for preferring a
synchronic-norms-only view rest on a misguided idea that agents are responsible
or blameworthy for whether their credences accord with epistemic norms.
Chapter Three considers an objection to both probabilism and conditionaliza-
tion, which comes by way of a form of epistemic decision theory. On this style of
decision theory, rational credences are those that best approximate the truth. Both
probabilism and conditionalization require us, in some circumstances, to have cre-
dences that we can know are not as close to the truth as alternatives that violate
probabilism or conditionalization. I argue in favor of another mathematical appa-
ratus for assessing credences in terms of epistemic utility, one that is importantly
different from its decision-theoretic counterpart. But, I argue, this other apparatus is
widely misinterpreted as recommending credences that best approximate the truth.
It doesn't; but it's not clear what it does do. This other mathematical apparatus
therefore stands in need of a philosophical interpretation.
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Chapter 1. Imprecise Evidence without
Imprecise Credences
Rationality places constraints on our beliefs. We should have the beliefs that our
evidence entails; we should have the credences (degrees of belief or confidence)
that our evidence supports. And rationality can place requirements on the fineness
of grain of our belief states. Proponents of precise credences ("sharpers") hold that
rationality requires agents to have attitudes that are comparatively fine-grained:
credences that are each represented by a unique real number. Proponents of im-
precise or "mushy" credences ("nonsharpers") hold that, in response to some kinds
of evidence, rationality requires credences that are coarser-grained, spread out over
multiple real numbers.1
Who's right?
It's important to distinguish the question of what credences we should have
from the question of what credences we do have. Even the sharper can agree that
precise credences might not be psychologically realistic for a number of reasons.
And so it might be that actual agents have, by and large, imprecise credences. But
this descriptive observation is orthogonal to the normative question that is here at
issue.
This paper concerns, instead, the nature of the norms that rationality imposes
on us. Does rationality require imprecise credences? Nonsharpers hold that it does:
ambiguous or unspecific evidence requires correspondingly ambiguous or unspe-
cific credences. I will argue that this is false. Ambiguous or unspecific evidence,
if it exists, at most requires uncertainty about what credences to have. It doesn't
require credences that are themselves ambiguous or unspecific.
Part of what is at stake in answering this question is the viability of the ar-
A third view might say that imprecise credences are sometimes permissible but never required. I'll
ignore this view in my discussion, but for taxonomical purposes, I understand this to be a precise
view. In my taxonomy, it's essential to the nonsharper view that some bodies of evidence mandate
imprecise credences, rather than simply permitting them.
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ray of tools that have been developed within the orthodox probabilistic framework,
traditional Bayesianism. Dropping traditional Bayesianism requires starting from
scratch in building decision rules (norms about what choices are rational) and up-
date rules (norms about how our beliefs should evolve in response to new informa-
tion). And as we'll see, proposed replacements for the traditional decision rules and
update rules have serious costs, including permitting what is intuitively rationally
impermissible, and prohibiting what is intuitively rationally permissible.
In sections 1 and 2, I introduce the imprecise view, its intuitive appeal, and what
I take to be its toughest challenges. In section 3, I discuss an attractive strategy for
avoiding these challenges. But once the veil is lifted, the strategy is revealed to be a
notational variant of a precise view. On this precise view, which I lay out in section
4, instead of representing agents as having multiple probability functions, we think
of agents as being uncertain over multiple probability functions. This precise view
can accommodate all of the (good) motivations for the imprecise view but faces
none of its challenges.
In section 5 we finally reach the showdown. Are there any reasons to adopt the
imprecise view that aren't equally good reasons for adopting the precise alternative
I laid out in section 4? The answer, I argue, is no: anything mushy can do, sharp
can do better.
1 The imprecise view
1.1 Some examples
Traditional Bayesians hold that beliefs come in degrees, conventionally represented
as real numbers from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the highest possible degree of
confidence and 0 represents the lowest. An agent's degrees of belief, standardly
called "credences," are constrained by the laws of probability and evolve over time
by updating on new evidence.
Nonsharpers hold that in the face of some bodies of evidence, it is simply ir-
rational to have precise credences. These bodies of evidence are somehow am-
biguous (they point in conflicting directions) or unspecific (they don't point in any
direction). It's an open question how widespread this kind of evidence is. On some
versions of the view, we can only have precise credences if we have knowledge of
objective chances. And so any evidence that doesn't entail facts about objective
chances is ambiguous or unspecific evidence, demanding imprecise credences. 2
2 Note: When I speak of having imprecise credences in light of bodies of evidence, I'm including
empty or trivial bodies of evidence.
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A variety of cases have been presented to elicit the nonsharper intuition. In
these cases, the nonsharper says, any precise credence would be unjustified or irra-
tional. Here are a few examples:
Toothpaste/jellyfish
"A stranger approaches you on the street and starts pulling out objects
from a bag. The first three objects he pulls out are a regular-sized tube
of toothpaste, a live jellyfish, and a travel-sized tube of toothpaste. To
what degree should you believe that the next object he pulls out will
be another tube of toothpaste?" (Elga, 2010, 1)
If there's any such thing as unspecific or ambiguous evidence, this looks like a
good candidate. Unless you have peculiar background beliefs, the evidence you've
received can seem too unspecific to support any particular precise credence. It
doesn't obviously seem to favor a credence like .44 over a credence like .21 or .78.
So what should you do when you receive evidence like this?
There's something puzzling about the idea that there could be a unique degree
to which your body of evidence confirms the hypothesis that the next object pulled
from the bag will be a tube of toothpaste. (What would it be?) So maybe neutrality
demands that you take on a state that equally encompasses all of the probability
functions that could be compatible with the evidence.
Here is a second example that has been used to motivate imprecise credences:
Coin of unknown bias
You have a coin that you know was made at a factory where they can
make coins of pretty much any bias. You have no idea whatsoever
what bias your coin has. What should your credence be that when you
toss it, it'll land heads? (See e.g. Joyce 2010.)
This sort of case is somewhat more theoretically loaded. After all, there is a sharp
credence that stands out as a natural candidate: .5. But Joyce (2010) and others have
argued that the reasoning that lands us at this answer is faulty. The reasoning relies
on something like the principle of indifference (POI). According to POI, if there is
a finite set of mutually exclusive possibilities and you have no reason to believe any
one more than any other, then you should distribute your credence equally among
them. But POI faces serious (though arguably not decisive) objections. 3 Without
something like it, what motivates the .5 answer?
3 In particular, the multiple partitions problem; see e.g. van Fraassen's (1989) cube factory example.
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According to Joyce, nothing does. There's no more principled reason to settle
on a credence like .5 than a credence like .8 or .4211. Joyce sees this as a case
of unspecific evidence. Of course, if you knew the precise objective chance of
the coin's landing heads, then you should adopt that precise credence. But if you
have no information at all about the objective chance, then the rational thing to
do is to have a credence that represents all of the numbers that could, given your
evidence, be equal to the objective chance of the coin's landing heads. In this case,
that might be the full unit interval [0, 1]. On Joyce's view, adopting any precise
credence would amount to making some assumptions that are unwarranted by your
very sparse evidence. (More on this in section 5.)4
The general claim-some might even say intuition-that underpins the non-
sharper's assessment of these sorts of cases is: any precise credence function would
be an inappropriate response to the evidence. It would amount to "taking a definite
stance" when the evidence doesn't justify a definite stance. Or it would involve
adopting attitudes that are somehow much more informed or informative than what
the evidence warrants. Or it would involve failing to fully withhold judgment where
judgment should be withheld.
Some quotations from defenders of imprecise credences:
Precise credences... always commit a believer to extremely definite
beliefs about repeated events and very specific inductive policies, even
when the evidence comes nowhere close to warranting such beliefs and
policies. (Joyce, 2010, 285)
If you regard the chance function as indeterminate regarding X, it
would be odd, and arguably irrational, for your credence to be any
sharper... How would you defend that assignment? You could say "I
don't have to defend it-it just happens to be my credence." But that
seems about as unprincipled as looking at your sole source of infor-
For a defense of POI, see (White, 2009).
4 There are other kinds of cases that have been used to motivate imprecise credences. One motivation
is the suggestion that credences don't obey trichotomy, which requires that for all propositions A and
B, c(A) is either greater than, less than, or equal to c(B). (See e.g. (Schoenfield, 2012).) Another is
the possibility of indeterminate chances, discussed in (Hdjek & Smithson, 2012): if there are interval-
valued chances, the Principal Principle seems to demand interval-valued credences. (I'll return to this
argument in section 5.) Hdjek & Smithson also suggest imprecise credences as a way of representing
rational attitudes towards events with undefined expected value. Moss (2012) argues that imprecise
credences provide a good way to model rational changes of heart (in the epistemic sense (if there
is such a thing)). And there are still other motivations for the claim that ordinary agents are best
modeled with imprecise credences, regardless of what rationality requires.
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mation about the time, your digital clock, which tells that the time
rounded off to the nearest minute is 4:03-and yet believing that the
time is in fact 4:03 and 36 seconds. Granted, you may just happen to
believe that; the point is that you have no business doing so. (Hijek &
Smithson, 2012, 38-39)
[In Elga's toothpaste/jellyfish case,] you may rest assured that your re-
luctance to have a settled opinion is appropriate. At best, having some
exact real number assessment of the likelihood of more toothpaste
would be a foolhardy response to your unspecific evidence. (Moss,
2012, 2)
The nonsharper's position can be summarized with the following slogan: unspecific
or ambiguous evidence requires unspecific or ambiguous credences.
1.2 What are imprecise credences?
Considerations like these suggest that sometimes (perhaps always) an agent's cre-
dences should be indeterminate or mushy or imprecise, potentially over a wide
interval. Some suggest that a rational agent's doxastic attitudes are representable
with an imprecise credence function, from propositions (sentences, events, ... ) to
lower and upper bounds, or to intervals within [0, 1].5 A more sophisticated version
of the view, defended by Joyce (2010), represents agents' doxastic states with sets
of precise probability functions. This is the version of the view that I'll focus on.
I'll use the following notation. C is the set of probability functions c that char-
acterize an agent's belief state; call C an agent's "representor." For representing
imprecise credences toward propositions, we can say C(A) = {x: c(A) = x for some
c E C}.
Various properties of an agent's belief state are determined by whether the dif-
ferent probability functions in her representor have reached unanimity on that prop-
erty. Some examples: an agent is more confident of A than of B iff for all c E C,
c(A) > c(B). An agent is at least .7 confident in A iff c(A) > .7 for all c E C. Her
credence in A is .7 iff c(A) = .7 for all c E C.
Similarly, if there's unanimity among the credences in an agent's representor,
there are consequences for rational decision making: an agent is rationally required
to choose an option 4 over an option yf if O's expected utility is greater than Yf's
relative to every c E C. Beyond this sufficient condition, there's some controversy
5 E.g. Kyburg (1983).
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among nonsharpers about what practical rationality requires of agents with impre-
cise credences. 6
2 Challenges for imprecise credences
The imprecise view has some appeal. But it also faces some major hurdles. In
this section I'll discuss one general challenge for imprecise views, and two spe-
cific objections (one pragmatic and one epistemic). There's a natural strategy often
mentioned by nonsharpers that might be able to handle both of these objections.
In the next section (section 3), I offer the nonsharper the most attractive version
of this strategy for saving the imprecise view. But it's a trap: this version of the
strategy would yield a version of the imprecise view that is indistinguishable from
a particular kind of precise view. And this sort of precise view is well-equipped to
handle ambiguous and unspecific evidence.
2.1 Fending off the permissivist alternative
There's one sort of precise view that can immediately accommodate the nonsharper's
starting intuition: that in cases like toothpaste/jellyfish and coin of unknown bias,
the evidence doesn't uniquely support any precise credence function. Permissivists
hold that there are bodies of evidence that don't single out one credence function as
the unique rational credence function to adopt. But they don't conclude from this
that we should have imprecise credences. Rather, the permissivist claims that there
are multiple precise credence functions that are all equally rationally permissible. 7
Permissivism is fairly controversial and faces some of its own challenges (see
e.g. White 2005). So a satisfactory argument against nonsharpers can't simply end
here. Furthermore, some of the objections to precise views that nonsharpers have
put forward will apply equally to both precise permissivism and precise impermis-
sivism. (I'll discuss these in section 5.)
Still, the possibility of permissivism is worth noting for two reasons. First, the
path from ambiguous evidence to imprecise credences is not direct, and there are
some well-known, respectable precise alternatives along the way. The objections
to the imprecise view that I will give, and the alternative proposal I endorse, are
equally available to both the permissivist and the impermissivist.
Second, the kinds of belief states that the imprecise view recommends are not
clearly discernible from the kinds of belief states a permissivist recommends. For
6 See (Weatherson, 2008), (Joyce, 2010), (Williams, 2011), and (Moss, 2012).
7 See, for example, (Kelly, forthcoming), (Meacham, manuscript), and (Schoenfield, forthcoming).
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example, when faced with a decision problem where values are held fixed, the im-
precise view and the precise permissivist view can both allow that there are multiple
permissible actions agents can take-multiple credences that would be permissible
to bet in accordance with. So there is an important general challenge for the non-
sharper: how can they explain what their view requires of our attitudes such that
it's not simply a version of precise permissivism? The nonsharper might say: we
demand credences that aren't fine-grained, and the permissivist allows fine-grained
credences! But as a question about psychology, we need an account of what that
amounts to. Functionalism or interpretivism will most naturally treat the two as
interchangeable.
So: how can the imprecise view avoid collapsing into one form or another
of the precise view? I'll leave this question open for the moment. But as I'll
argue in section 3, in order for the imprecise view to give an adequate response to
imprecision's greatest challenges, it may have to collapse into a precise view.
First, let me explain the two major challenges to the imprecise view: Elga's
(2010) pragmatic challenge and White's (2009) epistemic challenge.
2.2 The pragmatic challenge
The pragmatic challenge for imprecise credences comes from Elga (2010). The
argument is designed to show that there are certain kinds of rational constraints on
decision making under uncertainty. The imprecise view faces difficulty in ensuring
that rational agents with imprecise credences will satisfy these constraints.
Elga's challenge goes as follows: suppose you have an imprecise credence in
some proposition A, say C(A) = [.2,.8]. We'll make the standard idealizing as-
sumption that for you, value varies directly and linearly with dollars. You will be
offered two bets about A, one very soon after the other (before you have time to
receive new evidence or to change your priorities).
Bet 1 If A is true, you lose $10. Otherwise you win $15.
Bet 2 If A is true, you win $15. Otherwise you lose $10.
If you were pretty confident (> .6) that A was false, it would be rational for you to
accept only bet 1; and if you were pretty confident that A was true (> .6), it would
be rational for you to accept only bet 2. But since you're not confident of A or its
negation, it seems like you should accept both bets; that way you'll receive a sure
gain of $5.
It is intuitively irrational to reject both bets, no matter what credences you have.
The challenge for the nonsharper is to find some way to rule out the rationality of
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rejecting both bets when your credences are imprecise. So far the nonsharper's
only decision rule has been supervaluational: an agent is rationally required to
choose an option over its alternatives if that option's expected utility is greater than
its alternatives' relative to every c E C. The expected value of each of our bets,
considered in isolation, ranges from -$5 to $10, so neither is supervaluationally
greater than the expected value of rejecting each bet ($0). If this is a necessary and
not just sufficient condition for being rationally required to choose an option-if
the rule is E-admissibility-then in Elga's case, it'll be rationally permissible for
you to reject both bets. 8
Can the nonsharper give any good decision rule that prohibits rejecting both
bets in this kind of case?9 If not, then imprecise credences make apparently irra-
tional decisions permissible. After all, a pair of bets of this form can be constructed
for imprecise credences in any proposition, with any size of interval. So it's not
clear how the nonsharper can avoid permitting irrational decisions without demand-
8 Why? Well, consider t1, where you're offered bet 1, and t2, where you're offered bet 2. Whether
you've accepted bet 1 or not, at t2 it's permissible to accept or reject bet 2. (If you rejected bet 1, the
expected value of accepting bet 2 ranges from -- $5 to $10 and expected value of rejecting is $0; so it's
permissible to accept bet 2 and permissible to reject it. If you accepted bet 1, the expected value of
accepting bet 2 is $5 and the expected value of rejecting ranges from -$5 to $10, so it's permissible
to accept bet 2 and permissible to reject it.)
From here, there's a quick possibility proof that in some circumstances E-admissibility permits
rejecting both bets. Since at t2 it's permissible to accept or reject bet 2, at ti you might be uncertain
what you'll do in the future. Suppose you're .8 confident that you'll reject bet 2. There's a probability
function in your representor according to which c(A) = .8. According to that probability function, the
expected value of rejecting bet 1 is $2 and the expected value of accepting bet 1 is -$3. Since there's
a probability function in your representor according to which rejecting bet 1 is better than accepting it,
E-admissibility permits rejecting bet 1. So: in some circumstances, E-admissibility permits rejecting
both bets.
9 Elga discusses some possible decision rules, but argues that most of them suffer substantial objec-
tions. For example, a more stringent decision rule might say: choosing an option is permissible only
if that option maximizes utility according to every probability function in an agent's representor. But
that rule entails that there will often be cases where there are no permissible options, including the
case where you receive one of Elga's bets. For a case like that, it's uncontroversially absurd to think
that there's nothing you can permissibly do. Other alternative decision rules, e.g. acting on the ba-
sis of the c(A) at the midpoint of each C(A), effectively collapse into precise views. r-Maximin-
the rule according to which one should choose the option that has the greatest minimum expected
value-prohibits rejecting both of Elga's bets (and requires accepting both). But that decision rule
is unattractive for other reasons, including the fact that it sometimes requires turning down cost-free
information. (See (Seidenfeld, 2004); thanks to Seidenfeld for discussion.) Still other rules, such as
Weatherson's (2008) rule 'Caprice' and Williams's (2011) 'Randomize' rule, seem committed to the
claim that what's rational for an agent to do depends not just on her credences and values, but also her
past actions. This seems damningly akin to sunk cost reasoning. Unfortunately I don't have space to
give these alternatives the attention they deserve.
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ing that we always act on the basis of precise credences. And that, of course, teeters
toward collapsing into the precise view.
2.3 The epistemic challenge
White (2009) delivers the epistemic challenge:
"Coin game: You haven't a clue as to whether p. But you know that
I know whether p. I agree to write 'p' on one side of a fair coin, and
'-ip' on the other, with whichever one is true going on the heads side.
(I paint over the coin so that you can't see which sides are heads and
tails.) We toss the coin and observe that it happens to land on 'p'."
(175)
Let C be your credal state before the coin toss and let CP, be your credal state
after. Our proposition p is selected such that, according to the nonsharper, C(p) =
[0,1]. And learning that a fair coin landed on the 'p' side has no effect on your
credence in whether p is true, so C'p, (p) = [0, 1]. Ex hypothesi p = heads, and so
C'p, (p) = C'p, (heads).
So even though you know the coin is a fair coin, and seeing the land of the coin
toss doesn't tell you anything about whether the coin landed heads, the nonsharper
says: the rational credence to have after seeing the coin toss is C', (heads) =
[0, 1].10 Your prior credence in heads was .5-it's a fair coin-and seeing the result
of the coin toss ('p') doesn't tell you anything about whether heads. (After all, you
have no clue whether 'p' is true.) But you should still update so that your new
credence in heads is [0,1]. That's strange.
Furthermore, seeing the opposite result would also lead to the same spread
of credences: [0,1]. And so this case requires either a violation of Reflection or
a violation of the Principal Principle. Reflection entails that if you know what
credences your future (more informed, rational) self will have, you should have
those credences now. So Reflection requires that since you know how the coin toss
will affect your future credences, however the coin lands, you should have a prior
credence [0,1] in heads-even though you know the chance of the coin landing
heads is 50/50! So if you obey Reflection, you can't obey the Principal Principle,
10 Why do C'p, (p) and Cip, (heads) converge at [0, 1] rather than at .5? Well, if C',, (p) = .5 then for all
c E C, c(p I 'p') = .5. Symmetry surely requires the same update if the coin lands '-,p', so for all c E
C, c(p I '-p') = .5. But then for all c E C, c(p I 'p') = c(p I '-p') = .5. That entails the independence
of 'p' and p, so for all c G C, c(p) = .5. But this contradicts our initial assumption: C(p) = [0, 1].
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and vice versa.II
This phenomenon is called probabilistic dilation. There are a few reasons why
this is an unwelcome result. First, even if White's coin game example is artifi-
cial, the features of the case that are sufficient for probabilistic dilation can appear
in virtually any circumstances where you begin with a precise credence in some
proposition. All that's required is some possibility that that proposition is not prob-
abilistically independent of some other proposition about which you have unspe-
cific or ambiguous evidence.
Furthermore, it's not a welcome result to end up with too many very spread out
credences. One reason is that, at least with the sort of permissive decision theory
that falls naturally out of the imprecise view, we'll end up intuitively misdescribing
a lot of decision problems: a wide range of intuitively irrational actions will be
ruled rationally permissible.
Another reason is that a credence like [0, 11 or (0, 1) won't allow for inductive
learning, at least on the standard assumptions of the imprecise view (e.g. Joyce
2010). Take the coin of unknown bias example from above, where C(heads) =
C(tails) = (0,1). Suppose you see the coin tossed two million times and it comes
up heads one million times. Presumably for many probability functions in your
representor, c(heads I 1*,heads ) should be near .5. But, as Joyce acknowledges,2M tosses
there are at least two ways that your initial imprecision can force your credence
to remain spread out at (0,1). First, your representor might include "pig-headed"
probability functions that won't move their probability assignment for heads out of
some interval like (.1,.2) no matter what you condition on. Second, "extremist"
probability functions can prevent the total interval from moving. For each c that
moves its credence in heads closer to .5 conditional on 2M heds, there's some more
extreme function c* such that c(heads) = c*(heads I a s So even if every
credence function's probability in heads moves toward .5, the posterior interval
remains exactly where it was before the update.
So when your ignorance is extreme in this way, no inductive learning can take
place.12 And if White's epistemic challenge is correct, then the nonsharper pre-
dicts that the circumstances that force you into this state of ignorance must be very
widespread--even in cases where you have specific, unambiguous, and strong evi-
dence about objective chances.
11 Joyce argues there are ways of blocking the applicability of Reflection in this kind of case; see
(Schoenfield, 2012) for a rebuttal to Joyce's argument.
12See (Joyce, 2010), 290-291. Note that while probabilistic dilation is an inevitable outcome of any
imprecise view, the induction-related challenge can be avoided by placing some (arguably ad hoc)
constraints on which credence functions are allowable in an agent's representor.
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3 A poisoned pawn
A general strategy. How can the nonsharper respond to the pragmatic and epis-
temic challenges? A natural suggestion often comes up: both of these challenges
seem solvable by narrowing. Narrowing amounts to sharpening C(A) from some
wide spread like [0, 1] to something more narrow, maybe even some unique c(A).
Elga (2010) and Joyce (2010) both discuss this option. The narrowing strategy can
be invoked for both the epistemic and pragmatic challenges.
For the pragmatic challenge: narrowing one's credences to a singleton subset
of C will certainly guarantee that a rational agent presented with any pair of bets
like Elga's will not reject both.13 After all, either c(A) is greater than .4 or it's not.
If c(A) > .4, she will accept bet 2. And if c(A) <; .4-indeed, if c(A) is anywhere
below .6-then she will accept bet 1. So whatever the rational agent's credence in
A is, she will accept at least one of the bets. And even narrowing to a non-singleton
(i.e. imprecise) subset of C, faced with a particular bet, can avoid the challenge.
For example, C(A) = (.4,.6) ensures that you should accept both bets: since all
probability functions in C assign A credence greater than .4, accepting bet 2 has
greater expected value than rejecting it according to all c E C. And since they
all assign A credence less than .6, accepting bet 1 has higher expected value than
rejecting it according to all c E C.
For the epistemic challenge: one way to narrow one's credence so that inductive
learning is possible is by whittling off extremist and pig-headed credence functions.
And of course, narrowing to a unique non-pig-headed credence will allow for in-
ductive learning.
Some obstacles. If narrowing is understood as effecting a change in one's epis-
temic state, in order to achieve some goal (making a decision, performing induc-
tion), then there's an immediate objection. Narrowing can't be rationally permissi-
ble, because it involves changes in one's epistemic state without changes in one's
evidence. For the pragmatic case, though, Joyce (2010) argues that this objec-
tion can be avoided. Narrowing can be thought of not as a change in an agent's
epistemic state, but a change in how the agent's epistemic state is linked to how
she chooses actions to carry out. Pragmatic narrowing has no effect on an agent's
epistemic state; the narrowed down set of credence functions doesn't represent the
agent's beliefs. It just represents the subset of her representor that is relevant for
making the decision at hand.
Of course, this response is not available for the epistemic case. At best this
would allow for a pretense of learning. But for the epistemic case, we might not
13 Assuming her decision doesn't change the probability of the hypothesis in question.
21
think of narrowing as a diachronic adjustment of one's credal state. It might just be
that some sort of narrowing of C has been rationally required all along. So some
sort of narrowing strategy might well be valuable for both cases separately. And
ideally, we could put the strategy to work for both in some unified way.
A deeper worry: how can narrowing be accomplished in a non-ad-hoc way?
What kinds of plausible epistemic or pragmatic considerations would favor ruling
some credence functions in and ruling others out? For example, in the epistemic
case, we might want to shave off extremist and pig-headed credence functions.
But to avail themselves of that strategy, nonsharpers need to offer some epistemic
justification for doing so.
A sophisticated narrowing strategy. What would justify eliminating pig-headed
and extremist credences? Let me offer a hypothesis: a rational agent might be com-
paratively confident that these sorts of narrowings are less likely to be reasonable
to adopt, even for pragmatic purposes, than credence functions that aren't extremist
or pig-headed.
Of course, to say a sharp credence function is reasonable to adopt for narrow-
ing won't, on the imprecise view, be the same as saying the credence function is
rational to have. According to nonsharpers, no sharp credence function is rational,
at least relative to the kinds of evidence we typically face. And it's a bit tricky to
say what this second normative notion, "reasonability," is.
But arguably this notion already figures into nonsharpers' epistemology. Af-
ter all, most nonsharpers don't hold that our credence should be [0,1] for every
proposition that we have any attitude toward. Consider some proposition that, by
nonsharper lights, doesn't require a maximally spread out credence relative to an
agent's evidence. Why doesn't her representor include probability functions that
assign extreme values to that proposition?
It must be that the prior probability functions in an agent's representor have to
meet some constraints. Some probability functions are rationally inappropriate to
include in our credal states. Joyce, in introducing the notion of a representor, writes:
"Elements of C are, intuitively, probability functions that the believer takes to be
compatible with her total evidence" (288). Joyce certainly can't mean that these
probability functions are rationally permissible for the agent to have as her credence
function. On Joyce's view, none of the elements of C is rationally permissible to
have as one's sole credence function; they're all precise. So he must mean that
these probability functions all have some other sort of epistemic credentials. We
can leave precisely what this amounts to a black box, for a moment, and explore
what possibilities it opens up.
How does this help? Suppose it's correct that for some epistemic reasons, there
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are probability functions that cannot be included in a rational agent's representor, C.
It seems plausible that of the remaining probability functions in C, some might have
better or worse epistemic credentials-that is, are more reasonable-than others.
For example, in the coin of unknown bias case, even if C(A) = (0, 1), it's hard to
believe a rational agent would bet at odds other than .5. The probability functions
according to which c(heads) = .5 seem plausibly more reasonable to act on than
probability functions according to which c(heads) = .999 or = .0001.
So we can wrap our heads around the idea that some probability functions in C
deserve more weight in guiding our decisions than others. But that doesn't neces-
sarily justify eliminating those probability functions with worse credentials from C.
After all, there will be borderline cases. Consider, for example, which "extremist"
credences could be eliminated.
The possibility of borderline cases generates two worries. 14 First, narrowing by
simply drawing a boundary between very similar cases seems arbitrary: it's unclear
what would justify drawing the narrowing's boundary between some particular pair
of probability functions, rather than between some other pair. Second, we end up
predicting a big difference in the relevance of two probability functions in deter-
mining rational actions, even though there's not a big difference in how reasonable
they seem to be.
There's a natural alternative: instead of simply ruling some credence functions
in and ruling others out, we can impose a weighting over c E C such that all proba-
bility functions in C carry some weight, but some probability functions carry more
weight than others in determining what choices are rational. What weighting? Plau-
sibly: the agent's rational credence that c is a reasonable narrowing to adopt. For
example, pig-headed credence functions seem clearly less likely to be reasonable
narrowings to act on than credence functions that are responsive to inductive evi-
dence.
A weighting over probability functions in an agent's representor can be used to
determine a narrowed down credence for whatever proposition is in question. The
narrowing to adopt in A could be some sort of weighted average of each c(A) such
that c E C.
This proposal yields a narrowing strategy that has natural epistemic motiva-
tions. Acting on a narrowing based on a weighting doesn't require ad hoc choices
in the way that simply eliminating probability functions does. And furthermore,
this guarantees that the agent's multiple credence functions aren't idle in determin-
14 Alan Hdjek (2012) distinguishes these two types of concerns, both of which often feature in worries
throughout philosophy, about the arbitrariness involved in drawing sharp distinctions between bor-
derline cases.
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ing which narrowing she adopts. None simply gets thrown out.
So, have we solved the problems for the nonsharper?
The trap. The kind of imprecise view that results from this proposal is really
just a complicated notational variant of a precise view. Instead of having multiple
probability functions, the rational agent has a single probability function that gives
positive probability to the rationality of other credence functions. In other words,
this precise credence function includes uncertainty about its own rationality and
about the rationality of its competitors. The weighting of c E C are just the agent's
credences in each c's rationality.
Now, there might be other strategies that the nonsharper could adopt for coping
with the pragmatic and epistemic challenges. But I draw attention to this strategy
for two reasons.
First, I think it's a reasonably attractive strategy the nonsharper can adopt for
addressing these challenges. It's certainly the only narrowing strategy I know of
that provides a motivation for how and why the narrowing can take place.
Second, it brings into focus an observation that I think is important in this
debate, and that has been so far widely ignored: higher-order credences and higher-
order uncertainty can play the role that imprecise credences were designed for
Indeed, I'm going to try to convince you that they can play that role even better
than imprecise credences can.
4 The precise alternative
Before showing how this sort of precise view can undermine the motivations for
going imprecise, let's see what exactly the view amounts to.
We can expect rational agents to have higher-order credences of various kinds:
in particular, credences about whether or not their own credence functions are ra-
tional, and credences about whether other possible credence functions are rational.
I use the phrase "higher-order credences" broadly to mean credences about cre-
dences. Some philosophers reserve the phrase for credences about what credences
one has (for characterizing some sort of introspective uncertainty). That's not what
I'll be talking about.
It's compatible with even ideal rationality for an agent to be uncertain about
whether her credences are rational.15 An ideally rational agent can even be some-
15 Uncertainty about whether one's credences are rational is a form of normative uncertainty. Since
normative truths are generally held to be metaphysically necessary-true in all possible worlds-
we need to take care in modeling normative uncertainty, in order to ensure that normative truths
aren't automatically assigned probability 1. My own preference is to use an enriched possible worlds
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what confident that her own credences are not rational. 16 For example: if a rational
agent is faced with good evidence that she tends to be overconfident about a certain
topic and good evidence that she tends to be underconfident about that same topic,
she may doubt that the credence she has is exactly the credence that's warranted by
her evidence. So a rational agent may not know whether she's responded correctly
to her evidence. There are also some cases, too complex to discuss here, where an
ideally rational agent might simply not be in a position to know what her evidence
is, and therefore be uncertain whether her credence is warranted by the evidence.17
Nonsharpers hold that there are some bodies of evidence that are unspecific
or ambiguous. These bodies of evidence, according to the nonsharper, rationally
require that agents adopt a state that encompasses all credence functions compatible
(in some sense) with the evidence. On the precise view that I'm advocating, if
there really is ambiguous or unspecific evidence, then if faced with these bodies
of evidence, rational agents will simply be uncertain what credences it is rational
to have. That's compatible with continuing to have precise credences. Instead of
attributing all of the candidate probability functions to the agent, we push this set
of probability functions up a level, into the contents of the agent's higher order
credences.
A caveat: it's compatible with the kind of view I'm defending that there are
no such bodies of evidence. It might be that every body of evidence not only
supports precise credences, but supports certainty in the rationality of just those
precise credences.
Here is my claim: if there really are bodies of ambiguous or unspecific ev-
idence, then these bodies of evidence support higher-order uncertainty. 18 Elga's
toothpaste/jellyfish case is a promising candidate: when you're met with such an
odd body of evidence, you should be uncertain what credence would be rational to
have. And indeed, I think the nonsharper should agree with this point. What would
justify a spread-out credence like c(TOOTHPASTE) = [.2, .8] over [.1999, .7999]?
I also claim that once we take into account higher-order uncertainty, we'll see
that first-order imprecision is unmotivated. For example, consider the argument
Joyce (2010) uses to support imprecise credences in the coin of unknown bias
probability space, as in (Gibbard, 1990). Instead of defining probability as a measure over the space
of possible worlds, we define it over the space of world-norm pairs, where "norms" are maximally
specific normative theories.
16 See e.g. (Elga, 2008), (Christensen, 2010), and (Elga, 2012).
17 See (Williamson, 2007), (Christensen, 2010), and (Elga, 2012).
18 Note that they provide only a sufficient condition; there could be unambiguous, specific bodies of
evidence that also support higher-order uncertainty.
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case:
fu [the probability density function determined by POI] commits you
to thinking that in a hundred independent tosses of the [coin of un-
known bias] the chances of [heads] coming up fewer than 17 times is
exactly 17/101, just a smidgen (= 1/606) more probable than rolling
an ace with a fair die. Do you really think that your evidence justifies
such a specific probability assignment? Do you really think, e.g., that
you know enough about your situation to conclude that it would be an
unequivocal mistake to let $100 ride on a fair die coming up one rather
than on seeing fewer than seventeen [heads] in a hundred tosses? (284)
Answer: No. If the coin of unknown bias case is indeed a case of unspecific or
ambiguous evidence, then I'm uncertain about whether my evidence justifies this
probability assignment; I'm uncertain about what credences are rational. And so
I'm uncertain about whether it would be an unequivocal mistake to bet in this way.
After all, whether it's an unequivocal mistake is determined by what credences are
rational, not whatever credences I happen to have.
But if I'm uncertain about which credences are rational, there's no reason why I
should adopt all of the candidates. (If I'm uncertain whether to believe these socks
are black or to believe they're navy, should I adopt both beliefs?)
Of course, this only tells us something about the higher-order credences that are
rational to have in light of unspecific or ambiguous evidence: that they can reflect
uncertainty about what's rational, and that they're compatible with sharp first-order
credences. One might ask: which sharp first-order credences are rational? After
all, the nonsharper's initial challenge to the sharper was to name any first order
credences in the toothpaste/jellyfish case that could seem rationally permissible.
But the kind of view I'm advocating shouldn't offer an answer to that question.
After all, didn't I just say that we should be uncertain? It would be a pragmatic
contradiction to go on and specify what sorts of first-order credences are rational. 19
19 Unofficially, I can mention some possible constraints on rational lower-order credences. What's been
said so far has been neutral about whether there are level-bridging norms: norms that constrain what
combinations of lower and higher-order credences are rational. But a level-bridging response, in-
volving something like the principle of Rational Reflection, is a live possibility. (See (Christensen,
2010) and (Elga, 2012) for a important refinement of the principle.) According to this principle, our
rational first-order credences should be a weighted average of the credences we think might be ratio-
nal (conditional on their own rationality), weighted by our credence in each that it is rational. For-
mally, Elga's version of Rational Reflection says: where pi is a candidate rational credence function,
c(A I pi is ideal) = pi(A I pi is ideal). This principle determines what precise probabilities an agent
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So now we have a precise view that shows the same sensitivity to ambiguous
and unspecific evidence as the imprecise view. In effect, it does all the work that
the imprecise view was designed for, without facing the same challenges. So are
there any reasons left to go imprecise? In the remainder of this paper, I'm going to
argue that there aren't.
5 The showdown
Here is the dialectic so far. There is a lot of pressure on nonsharpers to move in the
direction of precision. The pragmatic and epistemic challenges both push in that
direction. But if rational agents must act as though they have precise credences,
then on the widely presupposed interpretivist view of credences-that whatever
credences the agent has are those that best explain and rationalize her behavioral
dispositions-then the game is up. As long as imprecise credences don't play a
role in explaining and rationalizing the agent's behavior, they're a useless compli-
cation.20
But the nonsharper might bite the bullet and reject interpretivism. Even if ratio-
nal agents are disposed to act as though they have precise credences (in all possi-
ble situations!), the nonsharper might claim, epistemic rationality nevertheless de-
mands that they have imprecise credences. These imprecise credences might play
no role in determining behavior. Still, the nonsharpers might say, practical and
epistemic norms impose different but compatible requirements. Practical norms
might require acting on a precise credence function, but epistemic norms require
having imprecise credences.2 1
should have when she has rational higher-order uncertainty. The Christensen/Elga principle might
not be the last word, but it's an attractive hypothesis. Note, however, that a principle like this won't
provide a recipe to check whether your credences are rational: whatever second-order credences you
have, you'll also be uncertain about whether your second-order credences are the rational ones to
have, and so on. And so, again, it would be inconsistent with the view I'm offering to provide a re-
sponse to the question of which sharp first-order credences are rational.
2 0 Hdjek & Smithson (2012) argue that interpretivism directly favors modeling even ideal agents with
imprecise credences. After all, a finite agent's dispositions won't determine a unique probability
function/utility function pair that can characterize her behavioral dispositions. And this just means
that all of the probability/utility pairs that characterize the agent are equally accurate. So, doesn't
interpretivism entail at least the permissibility of imprecise credences? I find this argument com-
pelling. But it doesn't tell us anything about epistemic norms (beyond some application of ought
implies can, which is always on questionable footing in epistemology). It doesn't suggest that evi-
dence ever makes it rationally required to have imprecise credences. And so this argument doesn't
take sides between the imprecise and precise views that I'm concerned with.
21 Note that this also requires biting the bullet on the epistemic challenge.
27
This bullet might be worth biting if we had good evidence that epistemic norms
in fact do require having imprecise credences. Then the nonsharper would be able
to escape the charge, from section 3, that any adequate narrowing strategy collapses
their view into the precise view (though again, at the cost of rejecting interpre-
tivism). So the big question is: Is there any good motivation for the claim that
epistemic norms require imprecise credences?
I'm going to argue that the answer is no. Any good motivation for going im-
precise is at least equally good, and typically better, motivation for going precise
and higher-order. In this section, I'll consider a series of progressive refinements of
the hypothesis that imprecise evidence mandates imprecise credences---each a bit
more sophisticated than the last. I'll explain how each motivation can be accommo-
dated by a precise view that allows for higher-order uncertainty. The list can't be
exhaustive, of course. But it will show that (to borrow from the late linguist Tanya
Reinhart) the imprecise view has a dangerously unfavorable ratio of solutions to
problems.
5.1 Nonsharper claim #1: Precise credences should reflect known chances
In motivating their position, nonsharpers often presuppose that without knowledge
of objective chances, it's inappropriate to have precise credences. Here's an exam-
ple:
A... proponent of precise credences... will say that you should have
some sharp values or other for [your credence in drawing a particular
kind of ball from an urn], thereby committing yourself... to a definite
view about the relative proportions of balls in your urn... Postulating
sharp values for [your credences] under such conditions amounts to
pulling statistical correlations out of thin air. (Joyce, 2010, 287, em-
phasis added)
Or again:
fu commits you to thinking that in a hundred independent tosses of the
coin [of unknown bias] the chances of [heads] coming up fewer than
17 times is exactly 17/101, just a smidgen (= 1/606) more probable
than rolling an ace with a fair die. (Joyce, 2010, 284, emphasis added)
It's difficult to see what exactly Joyce is suggesting. On a naive interpretation, he
seems to be endorsing the following principle:
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CREDENCE/CHANCE: having credence n in A is the same state as, or otherwise
necessitates, having credence ~ 1 that the objective chance of A is (or at
some prior time was) n.22
A somewhat flat-footed objection seems sufficient here: one state is a partial belief,
the content of which isn't about chance. The other is a full belief about chance. So
surely they are not the same state.
More generally: whether someone takes a definite stance isn't the kind of thing
that can be read locally off of her credence in A. There are global features of
an agent's belief state that determine whether that credence reflects some kind of
definite stance, like a belief about chance, or whether it simply reflects a state of
uncertainty.
For example, in the coin of unknown bias case, someone whose first-order
credence in HEADS is .5 on the basis of applying the principle of indifference will
have different attitudes from someone who believes that the objective chance of
HEADS is .5. The two will naturally have different introspective beliefs and differ-
ent beliefs about chance. The former can confidently claim: "I don't have any idea
what the objective chance of HEADS is"; "I doubt the chance is .5"; etc. Neither
is rationally compatible with taking a definite position that the chance of HEADS is
.5.
The agent who is uncertain about chance will exhibit other global differences in
her credal state from the agent with a firm stance on chance. A credence, c(A) = n,
doesn't always encode the same degree of resiliency relative to possible new evi-
dence. The resiliency of a credence is the degree to which it is stable in light of new
evidence. 23 When an agent's credence in A is n because she believes the chance
of A is n, that credence is much more stubbornly fixed at or close to n. Credences
grounded in the principle of indifference, in ignorance of objective chances, are
much less resilient in the face of new evidence. 24 For example, if your .5 credence
is grounded in the principle of indifference and then you learn that the last three
tosses of the coin have all landed heads, you'll substantially revise your credence
that the next coin will land heads. (After all, three heads is some evidence that
the coin is biased toward heads.) But if your .5 credence comes from the knowl-
edge that the chance is .5, then your credence shouldn't change in response to this
22 This is a slightly stronger version of what White (2009) calls the Chance Grounding Thesis, which
he attributes to a certain kind of nonsharper: "Only on the basis of known chances can one legiti-
mately have sharp credences. Otherwise one's spread of credence should cover the range of chance
hypotheses left open by your evidence" (174).
23 See (Skyrms, 1977).
24 See also (White, 2009, 162-164).
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evidence.
In short: the complaint against precise credences that Joyce seems to be offering
in the passages quoted above hinges on a false assumption: that having a precise
credence in a hypothesis A requires taking a definite view about chance. Whether or
not an agent takes a definite view about the chance of A isn't determined locally by
the precision of her credence in A. It depends on other properties of her credal state,
which can vary independently of her credence. And so having a precise credence
is compatible with having no definite views about chance.
5.2 Nonsharper claim #2: Precise credences are "too informative"
The second motivation for imprecise credences is a generalization of the first. Even
if precise credences don't encode full beliefs about chances, they still encode some-
thing that shouldn't be encoded: they're still too unambiguous and specific a re-
sponse to ambiguous or unspecific evidence.
Even if one grants that the uniform density is the least informative
sharp credence function consistent with your evidence, it is still very
informative. Adopting it amounts to pretending that you have lots and
lots of information that you simply don't have. (Joyce, 2010, 284)
How would you defend that assignment? You could say "I don't have
to defend it-it just happens to be my credence." But that seems about
as unprincipled as looking at your sole source of information about the
time, your digital clock, which tells that the time rounded off to the
nearest minute is 4:03-and yet believing that the time is in fact 4:03
and 36 seconds. Granted, you may just happen to believe that; the
point is that you have no business doing so. (Hijek & Smithson, 2012,
38-39)
Something of this sort seems to underpin a lot of the arguments for imprecise cre-
dences. But is this right?
Well, there's a clear sense in which specifying a set of probability functions
can be less informative than specifying a unique probability function. In science
and statistics, imprecise probabilities are used in cases where, because there is little
information, only a partial specification of probability can be given. So, when the
chances of a set of events aren't fully known, imprecise probabilities are useful for
representing both what chance information is available and the ways in which it is
limited. Imprecise probabilities are less informative about objective chances.
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But this only lends support to using a certain kind of mathematical apparatus
to represent chance. It certainly doesn't suggest that our mental states should be
imprecise. After all, scientists and statisticians almost all assume that there are
precise objective chances; they're just uncertain which probability function cor-
rectly represents them, and so can only give an imprecise specification of chance.
And so analogously, suppose we can only give an imprecise specification of the
rational epistemic probabilities, or of the degrees to which the evidence confirms a
hypothesis. Then, by analogy, we should be uncertain which probability function
is rational to adopt, or about the degree of evidential confirmation. But that's not
the nonsharper view. That's my view.
So, the analogy with imprecise probabilities in science, statistics, and probabil-
ity theory does not support the nonsharper view. It's certainly true that imprecise
credences encode less information than precise credences, for the same reason that,
in a possible worlds framework, a non-singleton set of worlds encodes less infor-
mation than a single world. But the real questions are:
(1) what kind of information is encoded, and
(2) is it problematic or irrational to encode that information?
The answers: (1) information about agents' mental states, and (2) no.
An ascription of a precise credence function is more informative than an as-
cription of a set of credence functions. After all, if you tell me that an agent has a
credence [.2,.7] in A, I know less about what bets she'll be inclined to accept then
if you tell me that she has credence .34.
But it's not more informative about things like coin tosses or their objective
chance. Instead, it's more informative about the psychology and dispositions of an
agent. This is third-personal information offered by the theorist about an agent's
attitudes, not information in the contents of agent's first-order attitudes.2 5 Precise
credences are unambiguous and specific about agents' doxastic states. They tell us,
for example, precisely how a rational agent will bet once we've fixed her utilities.
But why would there be anything wrong with being informative or unambiguous or
specific in this way?
It's uncontroversial that in a case like coin of unknown bias, an agent should
not presume to have information about how the coin will land, given how little
25 Of course, the rational agent may ascribe herself precise or imprecise credences and so occupy the
theorist's position. But in doing so, the comparative informativeness in her ascription of precise
credences is informativeness about her own psychological states, not about how coin-tosses might
turn out.
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evidence she has. In that sense, since she has almost no information, the less infor-
mation about coin tosses that she takes herself to have, the better. But that doesn't
mean that the less information the theorist has about the rational agent's mental
states, the better. And that is what is represented in assigning a precise credence
function.
After all: the rational agent is stipulated to have limited information available
to her, and so her beliefs should reflect that fact. She should be uncertain about
the coin's chances of landing heads (just like the scientists and statisticians). But
there is no similar stipulation that the theorist has limited information in character-
izing the rational agent. So there's just no reason why the theorist's assignments of
credences to the agent should be uninformative.
Objection 1. In the coin of unknown bias case, if c(HEADS) = .5, then you are
taking a specific attitude toward how likely it is that the coin lands heads. You think
the coin is .5 likely to land heads. That is information about the coin that the agent
is presuming to have.
Reply. What does it mean, in this context, to say The coin is .5 likely to land
heads? It doesn't mean that you think the chance of the coin landing heads is
.5; you don't know whether that's true. It doesn't even mean that you think the
evidential probability of the coin landing heads is .5; you can be uncertain about
that as well. "It's .5 likely that heads" arguably doesn't express a belief at all. It just
expresses the state of having .5 credence in the coin's landing heads. 26 But then the
.5 part doesn't tell us anything about the coin. It just expresses some aspect of your
psychological state.
Objection 2. If the evidence for a proposition A is genuinely imprecise, then
there is some sense in which adopting a precise credence in A means not withhold-
ing judgment where you really ought to.
Reply. If my credence in A is not close to 0 or 1, then I'm withholding judgment
about whether A. That's just what withholding judgment is. The nonsharper seems
to think that for some reason I should double down and withhold judgment again.
Why? It can't be because I'm not withholding judgment about what the evidence
supports; higher-order uncertainty takes care of that. If my credence in the propo-
sition the evidence supports my credence in A is also not close to 0 or 1, then I'm
clearly withholding judgment about what the evidence supports.
In short: there's just no reason to believe the slogan that ambiguous or unspe-
cific evidence requires ambiguous or unspecific credences. Why should the attitude
be confusing or messy just because the evidence is? (If the evidence is unimpres-
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26 Cf. Yalcin (forthcoming).
sive, that doesn't mean our credences should be unimpressive.) What is true is that
ambiguous or unspecific evidence should be reflected in one's beliefs, somehow or
other. But that might amount to simply believing that the evidence is ambiguous
and unspecific, being uncertain what to believe, having non-resilient credences, and
so on. And all of these are naturally represented within the precise model.
Finally, let's consider one more refinement of this objection, one that can give
some argument for the hypothesis that imprecise evidence requires imprecise cre-
dences.
5.3 Nonsharper claim #3: Imprecise confirmation requires imprecise
credences
A different form of argument for imprecise credences involves the following two
premises:
IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION The confirmation relation between bodies of evi-
dence and propositions is imprecise.
STRICT EVIDENTIALISM Your credences should represent only what your evi-
dence confirms.
These two claims might be thought to entail the imprecise view.27
According to nonsharpers, the first claim has strong intuitive appeal. It says
that, for some bodies of evidence and some propositions, there is no unique precise
degree to which the evidence supports the proposition. Rather, there are multiple
equally good precise degrees of support that could be used to relate bodies of ev-
idence to propositions. This, in itself, is not a claim about rational credence, any
more than claims about entailment relations are claims about rational belief. So in
spite of appearances, this is not simply a denial of the precise view, though the two
are tightly related.
In conjunction with STRICT EVIDENTIALISM, though, it might seem straight-
forwardly impossible for the sharper to accommodate IMPRECISE CONFIRMA-
TION. Of course, some sharpers consider it no cost at all to reject IMPRECISE
CONFIRMATION. They might have considered this a fundamental element of the
sharper view, not some extra bullet that sharpers have to bite.
But whether rejecting IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION is a bullet or not, sharpers
don't have to bite it. The conjunction of IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION and STRICT
EVIDENTIALISM is compatible with the precise view.
27Thanks to Wolfgang Schwarz, Rachael Briggs, and Alan Hdjek for pressing me on this objection.
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It's clear that IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION is compatible with one form of the
precise view, namely permissivism. If there are a number of probability functions
that each capture equally well what the evidence confirms, then precise permis-
sivists can simply say: any of them is permissible to adopt as a credence func-
tion. Permissivism is practically designed to accommodate IMPRECISE CONFIR-
MATION.
Of course, some nonsharpers might think that adopting a precise credence func-
tion on its own would amount to violating STRICT EVIDENTIALISM. But this
suggestion was based on the assumption that precise credences are somehow in-
appropriately informative, or involve failing to withhold judgment when judgment
should be withheld. In the last two subsections of this paper, I've argued that this
assumption is false. Precise permissivism is compatible with both claims.
Perhaps more surprisingly, precise impermissivism is also compatible with both
claims. If IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION is true, then some bodies of evidence fail
to determine a unique credence that's rational in each proposition. And so epis-
temic norms sometimes don't place a determinate constraint on which probability
function is rational to adopt. But this doesn't entail that the epistemic norms re-
quire adopting multiple probability functions, as the nonsharper suggests. It might
just be that in light of some bodies of evidence, epistemic norms place only an
indeterminate constraint on our credences.
Suppose this is right: when our evidence is ambiguous or unspecific, it's inde-
terminate what rationality requires of us. This is compatible with the precise view:
it could be supervaluationally true that our credences must be precise. Moreover,
this is compatible with impermissivism: it could be supervaluationally true that it's
not the case that more than one credence function is permissible.
How could it be indeterminate what rationality requires of us? There are cases
where morality and other sorts of norms don't place fully determinate constraints
on us. Here is a (somewhat idealized) example. When I'm grading, I may be
obligated to give As to excellent papers, A-s to great but not truly excellent papers,
B+s to good but not great papers, and so on. Suppose some paper I receive is a
borderline case of a great paper: it's not determinately great and not determinately
not great. And so here, it seems like I'm not determinately obligated to assign a
B+, nor am I determinately obligated to assign an A-. There's an indeterminacy in
my obligations. But this clearly doesn't mean that I have some obligation to mark
the student's paper with some sort of squiggle such that it's indeterminate whether
the squiggle is a B+ or an A-.2 8
28 Roger White suggested a similar example in personal communication.
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The upshot is clear: Indeterminacy in obligations doesn't entail an obligation
to indeterminacy.29 In this case, obviously I'm obligated to give a precise grade,
even if it's indeterminate which precise grade is required.
It might be protested that if the norms don't fully determine my obligations,
then it must be that either grade is permissible. But according to the (idealized)
setup, I'm obligated to give an A- iff a paper is great but not excellent and to give
a B+ iff a paper is good but not great. This paper is either great or good but not
great. So either I'm obligated to give an A- or I'm obligated to give a B+. The
indeterminacy doesn't imply that the norms are overturned and neither disjunct is
true. If anything, it implies that it's indeterminate whether a B+ is permissible or an
A- is permissible. Analogously: if IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION is correct, then it
might not be true of any credence function that it's determinately required (in light
of some evidence). But that doesn't mean that more than one probability function
is determinately permissible.
Furthermore, if both grades were permissible, then the choice between them
would be arbitrary (relative to the norms of grading). And we could imagine it
to be a further norm of grading that one never assign grades arbitrarily. So the
norms could be overtly impermissive. Then there's no getting around the fact that,
according to the norms of grading we've stipulated, I have no choice but to take
some action that isn't determinately permissible.
29 This point extends to another argument that has been given for imprecise credences. According to
Hijek & Smithson (2012), there could be indeterminate chances, so that some event E's chance
might be indeterminate-not merely unknown--over some interval like [.2,.5]. This might be the
case if the relative frequency of some event-type is at some times .27, at others .49, etc.-changing
in unpredictable ways, forever, such that there is no precise limiting relative frequency. Hijek &
Smithson argue that the possibility of indeterminate objective chances, combined with the following
natural generalization of Lewis's Principal Principle, yields the result that it is rationally required to
have imprecise or (to use their preferred term) indeterminate credences.
PP* Rational credences are such that C(A I Ch(A) = [n,m]) = [n,m] (if there's no inadmissible evi-
dence).
But there are other possible generalizations of the Principal Principle that are equally natural,
e.g. PPt:
PPt Rational credences are such that C(A I Ch(A) = [n, m]) E [n,m] (if there's no inadmissible evi-
dence):
The original Principal Principle is basically a special case of both. (Note that PPt only states a
necessary condition on rational credences and not a sufficient one. So it isn't necessarily a permissive
principle.) Hdjek & Smithson don't address this alternative, but it seems to me perfectly adequate for
the sharper to use for constraining credences in the face of indeterminate chances. Again, we cannot
assume that indeterminacy in chances requires us to have indeterminate credences.
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Analogously: even if epistemic norms underdetermine what credences are ra-
tional, it might still be the case that we're epistemically and rationally required
to adopt a precise credence function, and furthermore that impermissivism is true.
This might seem puzzling: if the evidence genuinely underdetermines which cre-
dences to have, then how could precise impermissivism be true? Well, it might be
an epistemic norm that we reject permissivism. (There's some motivation for this:
there's something intuitively problematic about having a credence function which
you take to be rational, but thinking that you could just as rationally have had a
different credence function.) If this is so, no fully rational credence function as-
signs nonnegligible credence to the possibility that multiple credence functions are
appropriate responses to a single body of evidence. 30 So precise impermissivism,
like precise permissivism, has no fundamental problem with accommodating IM-
PRECISE CONFIRMATION.
One concern I've often heard is that there's some analogy between the view I
defend and epistemicism about vagueness. Epistemicism is, of course, the view
that vague predicates have perfectly sharp extensions. We just don't what those
extensions are; and this ignorance explains away the appearance of indeterminacy.
One might think that the impermissive version of my view amounts to something
like an epistemicism about ambiguous evidence. Instead of allowing for the pos-
sibility of genuine indeterminacy, the thought goes, my view suggests we might
simply not know what sharp credences are warranted. Still, though, the credence
that's required is perfectly sharp.
But a precise view that countenances genuine indeterminacy-that is, indeter-
minacy that isn't merely epistemic-is fundamentally different from epistemicism
about vagueness. And allowing for indeterminate epistemic requirements, and so
IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION, is clearly allowing for genuine indeterminacy. The
supervaluational story I offered above quite closely analogous to one of epistemi-
cism's major opponents, supervaluationism. The supervaluationist about vagueness
holds that there is determinately a sharp cut-off point between non-bald and bald;
it just isn't determinate where that cut-off point is. Similarly, the precise imper-
missivist who accepts IMPRECISE CONFIRMATION accepts that for any body of
evidence, there is determinately a precise credence function one ought to have in
light of that evidence; it's just indeterminate what that precise credence function is.
30 Of course, that's compatible with permissivism's being true; maybe we're epistemically required to
accept a falsehood. But if impermissivists are right that it's a norm of rationality to reject permis-
sivism, then they must accept that the norms of rationality apply to them, and so reject permissivism.
The degree to which you are a realist or antirealist about epistemic norms will probably affect how
problematic you find this possibility.
36
6 Conclusion
The nonsharper claims that imprecise evidence requires imprecise credences. I've
argued that this is false: imprecise (ambiguous, nonspecific) evidence can place
special constraints on our attitudes, but not by requiring our attitudes to be impre-
cise. The nonsharper's view rests on the assumption that having imprecise cre-
dences is the only way to exhibit certain sorts of uncertainty: uncertainty about
chance (objective probability), about rational requirements (evidential probability),
or about confirmation (logical probability). I've argued that these sorts of uncer-
tainty can naturally be captured within the precise framework. All we need are
higher-order probabilities: subjective probability about other forms of probability,
like chance and ideally rational probability.
The kind of precise view I defend can accommodate all the intuitions that were
taken to motivate the imprecise view. So what else does going imprecise gain
us? As far as I can tell, only vulnerability to plainly irrational diachronic decision
behavior and an inability to reliably use Reflection or to reason by induction.31
Better to drop the imprecision and stick with old-fashioned precise probabilities.
31 In other words, the pragmatic and epistemic challenges from section 2.
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Chapter 2. Don't Stop Believing
Epistemic rationality requires two kinds of coherence. Broadly speaking, an agent's
beliefs must fit well together at a time, and also fit well together over time. At any
particular time, we should avoid believing contradictions, believe the consequences
of our beliefs, and so on. And over time, we should respect the evidence we've
received and adapt our beliefs to new evidence.
The traditional Bayesian picture of epistemic rationality is simply the conjunc-
tion of a synchronic claim and a diachronic claim:
Synchronic coherence: Rational belief states form a probability function and are
rationalized by one's evidence.
Diachronic coherence: Rational belief states evolve by retaining old certainties
and conditioning on new evidence.
Recently, however, a number of philosophers have pushed for the abandonment
of diachronic norms. Norms like Conditionalization, that have historically been
understood as constraints on beliefs at different times, have been reinterpreted as
purely synchronic constraints. According to this view, the norms of rationality,
practical or epistemic, apply only to time-slices of individuals.
I want to resist this movement. I'll argue for the following claim:
Diachronic Rationality: There are diachronic norms of epistemic rationality.
The problem that the opponent of diachronic rationality poses is this: diachronic
norms of epistemic rationality are in tension with epistemic internalism. Epistemic
internalism, in its most generic form, is the view that whether or not you're epis-
temically rational supervenes on facts that are 'internal' to you. The relevant sense
of 'internal' can be cashed out in a variety of ways. If there are diachronic norms
of epistemic rationality, then whether you're epistemically rational now is deter-
mined in part by your past epistemic states. And facts about the past are not, in the
relevant sense, internal to you.
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The proponent of diachronic norms faces a dilemma. We can't endorse both of
the following claims: that epistemic rationality imposes cross-temporal constraints
on belief, and that epistemic rationality is determined only by what is 'internal' to
the agent.
Faced with a choice between diachronic norms and epistemic internalism, I
will argue that we should choose diachronic norms. I argue that that the rejection
of diachronic norms incurs a number of serious problems: most notably, that it
permits discarding evidence, and that it treats agents who are intuitively irrational
as epistemic ideals.
Here is how the paper will proceed: in section 1, I'll explain the framework
in which much of my discussion takes place, i.e., the Bayesian view of rational-
ity. Then I'll introduce in more detail the objection to diachronic epistemic norms,
some of its common motivations, and how the debate is situated within epistemol-
ogy.
In section 2, I offer three objections to the synchronic-norms-only view. In
2.1, I argue that time-slice rationality entails that discarding evidence is rational.
2.2 argues that there are intuitive normative differences between agents who con-
form to diachronic norms and those who don't. The opponent of diachronic norms
is committed to a strong claim: that no agent can ever be worse than another in
virtue of purely diachronic differences between them. There are intuitive coun-
terexamples to this generalization. In 2.3, I argue that according to an attractive
view in philosophy of mind, all irrationality is fundamentally diachronic. So the
synchronic-norms-only view may wind up committed to there being no epistemic
rationality at all.
In section 3 I discuss the motivates, explicit or tacit, of the synchronic-norms-
only view. I discuss the idea that cognitive limitations somehow limit our epistemic
liability in 3.1. In 3.2 I discuss the idea of epistemic ought-implies-can and epis-
temic responsible-implies-can. 3.3 describes a notion of relative rationality, which
allows us to accommodate many of the intuitions cited in favor of the synchronic-
norms-only view.
Section 4 discusses an objection to diachronic norms prohibiting information
loss. What if one can ensure a net gain in information only at the cost of losing
some information? I discuss diachronic norms that can accommodate the idea that
this sort of 'information trade-off' can be rational. I conclude briefly in section 5.
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1 The conflict
1.1 Bayesianism
Before I begin, let me state some background assumptions. First, I will assume a
partial belief framework. (Nothing hinges on this.) On this view, beliefs come in
degrees (where a degree of belief is called a 'credence'). Credences fall in the inter-
val [0, 1], where credence 1 represents certain belief, credence 0 represents certain
disbelief, credence 1 represents maximal uncertainty, and so on. A person's total
belief state is represented by a credence function, i.e. a function from propositions
to real numbers in [0, 1].
According to the classical Bayesian picture, there are two kinds of coherence
that rational credences exhibit, one synchronic and one diachronic. The synchronic
constraint is known as Probabilism:
Probabilism: Rational credences form a probability function: that is, they obey
the following three axioms. Where V/ is the set of all worlds under consid-
eration1 :
1. Nonnegativity: for all propositions A C YP, Cr(A) > 0
2. Normalization: Cr(111) = 1
3. Finite additivity: if A and B are disjoint, then Cr(A V B) = Cr(A) +
Cr(B)
The diachronic constraint is known as Conditionalization:
Conditionalization: let E be the strongest proposition an agent learns between t
and t'. Then the agent's credences should update such that Cr, (-) = Cr, ( I
E), where Cr(A I B) is usually defined as follows:
Cr(A I B) = Cr(AAB)Cr(B)
Conditionalization has two basic effects: first, you treat all possibilities (that
is, worlds) that are incompatible with your new evidence as dead. They are given
credence 0. Second, you reapportion your credences among the remaining live
possibilities, preserving relative proportions between the possibilities.
Throughout I will be assuming that credence functions range over subsets of a finite set of worlds.
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Now, one of the consequences of Conditionalization is that once you rationally
learn something, you can't rationally unlearn it. You can't rationally lose informa-
tion. (The set of live possibilities only shrinks.) This is, as stated, a strong and
fairly controversial constraint.
There are analogs to Conditionalization in the full belief framework. For exam-
ple, Jane Friedman (manuscript), defends the following norm of inquiry: when a
question has been closed, don't reopen it. This is a close analog to Conditionaliza-
tion's controversial consequence: that possibilities with credence 0 cannot recover
positive probability. There are other diachronic norms that are weaker: for ex-
ample, some forms of epistemic conservatism say that if you rationally believe a
proposition at an earlier time, then it remains rational for you to continue believing
it at later times, as long as you don't receive any new, disconfirming evidence.
I want to offer a general diachronic norm that cross-cuts whether we treat be-
lief states with the full belief framework or the partial belief framework, and also
cross-cuts whether we treat the overriding diachronic norm as Conditionalization,
or whether we accept alternatives diachronic norms on credences (e.g. Jeffrey Con-
ditionalization). Here is a candidate:
Diachronic evidentialism: An agent should only change her epistemic state by
updating on new evidence.
Note that this is, on its face, a fairly strong norm. One needn't endorse this strong
a norm in order to believe that there are diachronic constraints on rationality. But
we'll start with something this strong, and see what can be said in favor of it.
First, though, we should consider objections to diachronic norms.
1.2 The rejection of diachronic rationality
Sarah Moss (2012) describes a 'general movement' towards rejecting diachronic
norms of rationality. The aim of this movement: to take statements of diachronic
norms like Conditionalization and replace them with analogous synchronic norms.
According to Moss:
It is naive to understand Conditionalization as a diachronic rule that
says what credences you should have at a later time, given what cre-
dences you had at an earlier time, literally speaking. Instead we should
understand it as a synchronic rule... Of course, one might claim that
Conditionalization was originally intended as a literally diachronic
rule, and that 'Conditionalization' should therefore be reserved for a
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rule that binds together the credences of different temporal slices of
agents-but I am inclined to interpret the Founding Fathers charitably.
(Moss, 2012, 24)
Opponents of diachronic epistemic norms include Talbott (1991), Christensen (2000),
Williamson (2000), Meacham (2010), and Hedden (2012).
There are a variety of motivations for a synchronic-norms-only epistemology.
Some, e.g. Williamson, simply find diachronic constraints like Diachronic Eviden-
tialism implausible. For others, the synchronic-norms-only view follows from a
more general principle-in particular, some form of epistemic internalism. Here,
for example, is Meacham (2010):
In Bayesian contexts, many people have appealed to implicitly inter-
nalist intuitions in order to support judgments about certain kinds of
cases. But diachronic constraints on belief like conditionalization are
in tension with intemalism. Such constraints use the subjects beliefs
at other times to place restrictions on what her current beliefs can be.
But it seems that a subjects beliefs at other times are external to her
current state. (87)2
There are a number of different forms of epistemic internalism. The two vari-
eties that are perhaps most familiar are mentalist internalism and access internal-
ism.
Mentalist Internalism: the facts in virtue of which a subject is epistemically ra-
tional or irrational supervene the subject's mental states. 3
Access Internalism: the facts in virtue of which a subject is epistemically rational
or irrational supervene on those of the subject's mental states that she's in a
position to know she is in.
It's worth noting that neither of these immediately conflicts with diachronic
constraints on rationality, at least as stated. After all, it might be that what's rational
2 Note that while Meacham argues that there is a conflict between Conditionalization and internalism,
and provides a synchronic alternative to Conditionalization, he is (at least in his (2010) not committed
to the denial of traditional diachronic Conditionalization.
3 Note that this is (at least arguably) orthogonal to internalism about mental content. It's consistent
to hold that whether an agent's beliefs are rational is determined by what's in the head, while at the
same time holding that the correct characterization of the contents of an agent's beliefs will involve
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for an agent believe at one time supervenes on her mental states at another time, or
her mental states at many different times, or those mental states that she has access
to at many different times, etc.
Opponents of diachronic norms often appeal to a form of access-internalism:
facts about our past mental states are irrelevant to our current rationality because
they are, at least in some circumstances, inaccessible to us. 4 (A mental state is
accessible to an agent iff, if the agent is in the mental state, then she is in a position
to know that she is.) And so the internalist objection to diachronic rationality is
best interpreted as involving the following form of internalism:
Time-Slice Internalism: the facts in virtue of which a subject is epistemically ra-
tional or irrational at a particular time t supervene on those of the subject's
mental states that she's in a position to know she is in at t.
Here's an example statement of this sort of internalism:
Whether it is rational to retain or abandon a belief at a time is a mat-
ter of which of these makes sense in light of your current epistemic
perspective, i.e., in light of what you currently have to work with in
revising your beliefs. (McGrath, 2007, 5)
Time-slice internalism immediately entails that the norms governing epistemic ra-
tionality are purely synchronic.
The motivations for time-slice internalism draws on an analogy between the
past and the external: our access to our past mental states is, at least in principle,
limited in just the same way as our access to the external world.5 The fact that
we had certain mental states in the past does not entail that we are, at present, in a
position to know that we had those mental states.
We can show the differences between time-slice internalism and traditional ac-
cess internalism by appeal to different forms of skeptical scenario:
Example #1
Suppose there are two agents who have exactly the same mental states.
Furthermore, both agents have access to exactly the same mental states.
appeal to the agent's environment.
4 Williamson is, of course, an exception, since he is not an internalist of any sort. Christensen's objec-
tion to diachronic norms, which I discuss in section 4, doesn't require appeal to any form of internal-
ism.
5 Meacham (2010), Hedden (2012).
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But one agent has mostly true beliefs about the external world; the
other is a brain in a vat and is systematically deceived about the exter-
nal world.
The internalist intuition about this case: if the undeceived agent is rational, so is
the brain in the vat.
The time-slice internalist invites us to make the analogous judgment about an
agent who is systematically deceived not about the external world, but about her
past memories:
Example #2
Suppose there are two agents who have exactly the same mental states
at a particular time t. Furthermore, both agents have access to ex-
actly the same mental states. But one agent has mostly true beliefs
about her past memories; the other has a brain implant that dramat-
ically alters her beliefs, memories (or, if you like, quasi-memories),
and other mental states erratically, and so at t she is systematically
deceived about her past beliefs.
The question is: should these cases be treated as epistemically analogous? Do we
have the same kind of intuition that, in the second example, if the ordinary agent is
rational, then the memory-scrambled agent is rational? I would find it surprising if
anyone claimed to have strong intuitions about whether the latter agent is rational.
The proponent of synchronic-norms-only rationality emphasizes the analogy
between the agent who's deceived about the external world and the agent whose
memories are regularly scrambled. After all, they are both doing the best they can
under strange, externally imposed circumstances.
The proponent of diachronic norms responds that the scrambled agent should
instead be understood on analogy to someone who is given a drug that makes him
believe contradictions. They are both doing the best they can under strange, exter-
nally imposed circumstances-but nevertheless, they are not ideally rational. I'll
argue for this claim in greater detail in section 3.
1.3 Orienting the debate
I'm concerned to defend a fairly weak claim: that there are diachronic norms of
epistemic rationality. Advocating diachronic epistemic norms does not entail advo-
cating Conditionalization, which is clearly an extremely strong constraint.
To orient the debate over diachronic norms, we can consider various kinds of
loose (!) alliances. The debate is in some ways aligned in spirit with the debate over
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epistemic externalism v. internalism, for obvious reasons: if there are genuinely
diachronic epistemic norms, then whether a belief state is rational at a time can
depend on facts that are inaccessible to the agent at that time.
There are also some similarities in spirit between defenders of diachronic norms
and defenders of epistemic conservatism. According to epistemic conservatism
(at least, of the traditional sort; there are, of course, varieties of conservatism), if
you find that you have a belief, that provides some (defeasible) justification for
continuing to have that belief. One way of drawing out this analogy: the epistemic
conservatist holds that if an agent rationally believes that p at t, then it is (ceteris
paribus) permissible for the agent to believe that p at a later t'. 6 The defender of
a diachronic norm like Conditionalization holds that if an agent rationally believes
that p (with certainty) at t, then she is rationally required to believe that p at t'.
But it's worth noting that there are weaker diachronic requirements that could
constrain rational belief: for example, that one shouldn't reduce or increase con-
fidence in a proposition (in which her previous credence was rational) unless she
receives new evidence or forgets evidence. The time-slice internalist is, therefore,
endorsing a fairly strong claim. As I'll argue in the next section, there are costs to
denying that rationality imposes any diachronic constraints on belief.
2 Problems for time-slice rationality
2.1 Problem #1: permissibly discarding evidence
One of the benefits that time-slice internalists claim for their view is that, by reject-
ing Conditionalization, they are able to vindicate the idea that forgetting doesn't
make a person irrational. If Conditionalization applies, without qualification, over
the whole of an agent's life, then any instance of forgetting would be sufficient to
make the agent irrational.
The flip side is that time-slice internalism also makes any instance of discarding
evidence epistemically permissible. And discarding evidence is a canonical exam-
ple of a violation of epistemic norms. The reason that time-slice internalism has
this effect is that discarding evidence is a fundamentally diachronic phenomenon.
At some time, you receive evidence. At a later time, your attitudes fail to reflect the
fact that you've received that evidence.
Example #3
6 See e.g. (Burge, 1997).
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Suppose an agent has strong beliefs about whether capital punishment
has a deterrent effect on crime. Then he learns of a study that provides
evidence against his view. So he should reduce his confidence in his
belief. But instead our agent (involuntarily) discards the evidence; he
loses any beliefs about the study; it has no enduring effect on his at-
titudes regarding capital punishment. Now he can go on confidently
endorsing his beliefs without worrying about the countervailing evi-
dence.
This is a standard example of irrationality. (One might object: an agent like this
is epistemically irrational only if he voluntarily discards the evidence. But cog-
nitive biases are not voluntary; so this objection would have the consequence that
cognitive biases never result in irrational belief. I take this to be uncontroversially
false.)
Discarding evidence is epistemically irrational. Therefore there are diachronic
norms of epistemic rationality. There's not much more to say about this. But to my
mind it is a serious challenge to the synchronic-norms-only view; perhaps the most
serious.
2.2 Problem #2: deviating from epistemic ideals
Some kinds of belief change are plausibly described as deviating from some sort
of epistemic ideal, even when no synchronic norms are violated. It might be con-
troversial whether, by virtue of deviating from the ideal, the agent is irrational. But
given that there are purely diachronic epistemic ideals to deviate from, it follows
that there are diachronic epistemic norms.
Consider again an agent whose total belief state is entirely overhauled at reg-
ular, and perhaps frequent, intervals (every minute? every second?). At every
instant her credences are probabilistically coherent. And they uphold any other
synchronic constraints on rational belief: for example, they are appropriately sen-
sitive to chance information; they reflect whatever the epistemically appropriate
response is to whatever phenomenological inputs the agent has at that instant; etc.
However strong you make the norms of synchronic rationality, our agent obeys all
of those norms at each instant.
But her total belief state at one moment is largely different from her total belief
state at the next. If you asked her a minute ago where she was from, she'd say
Orlando; if you asked her now, she'd say Paris; if you ask her a minute from now,
she'll say Guelph. These changes are random.
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The time-slice internalist is committed to the claim that our agent is ideally ra-
tional. I think this is false. Whether or not the agent rises to the level of rationality,
it is clear that she is epistemically sub-ideal: she is doing worse, epistemically, than
someone whose credences are more stable over time.7
Objection: If her evidence changes with each belief overhaul, then perhaps it is
rational for her to overhaul her beliefs so frequently.
Reply: In order to assess whether her evidence changes with each belief over-
haul, we would need to say more about what 'her evidence' is. For example, if you
believe her evidence is what she knows,8 then no doubt it'll overhaul, since her be-
liefs overhaul. That doesn't get us any further toward defending the claim that she
is rational. It might just be that she irrationally stops believing various propositions
that she previously knew.
If you believe her evidence is something else-perhaps something to do with
phenomenology-then in order to ensure that the example is one where she obeys
synchronic norms, this will have to overhaul regularly too. But let's note that phe-
nomenology a very, very thin source of information. If you think that memorial
phenomenology is the basis for your beliefs-consider how few of those beliefs
can be justified on the basis of memorial phenomenology at any given moment.
There is a limit to how much phenomenology you can conjure up in a short time
span. To the extent that I understand this sort of view, it seems to me that it is
susceptible to the same charge that the time-slice internalist presses against the
defender of Conditionalization: that it declares us all irrational.
On the other hand, if diachronic evidentialism is correct, then 'her evidence' is
all the evidence she has received, not just the evidence that is accessible to her in
the moment. The diachronic will say: her evidence does not dramatically change,
and therefore it's irrational for her beliefs to dramatically change.
Now, one can agree with me that the agent with erratically shifting beliefs is
epistemically non-ideal, and still judge the agent to be rational. One might, for
example, have a satisficing view of rationality: maybe it isn't necessary to perfectly
satisfy all epistemic norms in order to be epistemically rational. This kind of view
isn't common among Bayesians, who tend to accept that rationality just is ideal
rationality, and who tend to accept happily that none of us is rational. But I take
it that this is a common presupposition in informal epistemology. For example,
7 Of course, it's entirely appropriate that an agent's beliefs should continuously change a little all the
time: she should update on new information about, e.g., the passage of time, new evens that she
encounters, etc. But in the example I'm concerned with, a much greater proportion of her beliefs
change, and not simply because she's exposed to new evidence.
8 See (Williamson, 2000) for the canonical defense of this identity.
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informal epistemologists typically accept that it's not rationally required that we
believe all the consequences of our beliefs, though we would be rationally better if
we did.
As long as we accept that the agent whose credences shift erratically is doing
worse, epistemically speaking, than the agent whose credences only change by
rational update on evidence, then for my purposes, it doesn't matter whether we
call the former agent irrational or rational. We have already admitted that there are
diachronic epistemic norms.
2.3 Problem #3: all incoherence is diachronic
Some form of functionalism about belief is widely held among formal epistemol-
ogists. Probably the most influential form is interpretivism, the view that your
belief state is simply the body of credences that best rationalize your behavioral
dispositions.
One effect of this sort of functionalism is that the kinds of facts in virtue of
which you believe A at a particular time t are also facts in virtue of which you don't
believe -,A at t. Similarly, the facts in virtue of which you have credence .6 in B at
t also make it the case that you have credence .4 in -,B at t. The facts that make it
the case that you've received evidence that C at t are facts that make it also the case
that you increase your credence in C at t. And so on.
How, then, can we ever correctly attribute incoherence to anyone? Agents can
be 'fragmented': they can, in effect, believe different things relative to different
contexts, or for different purposes. For example, an agent may exhibit a belief that
A in her linguistic behavior in some contexts, and yet manifest a belief that -,A in
her non-linguistic actions in another context.
One needn't accept the full fragmentationist package in order to accept that the
very facts that make it the case that a person believes A at a particular time also
make it the case that he rejects -,A at that time; and similarly for other sorts of
relations that beliefs stand in.
An effect of this view: in a particular context, at a particular time, an agent
is always synchronically coherent. Synchronic coherence, on this interpretation, is
either a trivial norm, or else a norm constraining belief-attribution rather than belief
itself.
If this view in philosophy of mind is correct, opponents of diachronic rationality
are pushed in to a corner. They must either reject this attractive philosophy of mind,
or else reject the idea that there are any substantive epistemic constraints on belief.
49
Neither of these is an attractive option.9
3 Epistemic 'blamelessness' does not entail epistemic ide-
ality
3.1 Diachronic evidentialism and information loss
Let me emphasize again: I am concerned primarily with defending Diachronic
Rationality, the claim that there are diachronic epistemic norms. Here are two
stronger claims:
Rationality = Ideal Rationality In order to be epistemically rational, one must
perfectly satisfy all epistemic norms, synchronic or diachronic;
or even stronger:
Rationality Requires Lifelong Conditionalization In order to be epistemically
rational, you must satisfy Conditionalization over the entire course of your
life.
There are a variety of ways we could resist these extensions of Diachronic Ra-
tionality. For example, you might accept that satisfying Conditionalization would
make an agent epistemically better but that it isn't always necessary for rationality;
perhaps there are sometimes extenuating circumstances. Or you might accept that
Conditionalization is rationally required over stretches of time, but not an agent's
entire life. (Perhaps it's required between instances of some psychological event
of forgetting, where this might be psychologically distinguished from discarding
evidence.)
The real question is: who is making the universal claim and who is making
the existential claim? The opponent of diachronic norms insists that no one is ever
irrational by virtue of diachronic facts. All we need to convince ourselves that
this view is false is one instance where, e.g., discarding evidence is epistemically
sub-ideal.
9 Objection: fragmentationists might also hold that individual fragments also necessarily update by
Conditionalization, and so for each fragment this norm is also trivial. Reply: One can exhibit irra-
tionality diachronically in other ways than by failing to conditionalize within a fragment. For exam-
ple, fragments can conflict with each other in such a way as to make the agent irrational. But the
facts in virtue of which this is true have to do with different fragments characterizing the agent's be-
lief state manifest at different times.
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Nevertheless, I want to explore a defense of diachronic evidentialism, the com-
paratively strong claim that epistemically, we should only change our beliefs by
updating on new evidence. We'll set aside the question of whether an agent who
violates diachronic evidentialism is irrational in all circumstances.
One form of diachronic evidentialism is Conditionalization. A common com-
plaint against Conditionalization is that it entails that forgetting something learned
with certainty is irrational. This result is often met with an incredulous stare; coun-
terargument is treated as unnecessary.
Forgetting is not irrational; it is just unfortunate. (Williamson, 2000,
219).
It seems to me that forgetting is not just unfortunate but epistemically unfortunate.
And 'epistemic misfortune' is simply a gentler name for epistemic sub-ideality. In
any case, even if Williamson is correct, it may still be that Conditionalization has
epistemic normative force.10
Let me acknowledge: I'm not concerned about whether we accept the claim I
above called 'Rationality = Ideal Rationality.' Where we draw the line between
epistemic trespasses that are is sufficient for irrationality and those that aren't
doesn't seem to me obviously substantive. Sociologically speaking, formal and
informal epistemologists tend to talk about rationality in quite different ways. For
many informal epistemologists, to be 'irrational' is to be (at least a little) insane;
the majority of us are by and large rational. It is common to think, e.g., that one is
not rationally required to believe all the consequences of one's beliefs (even though
perhaps by doing so you'd be epistemically better). By contrast, among formal
epistemologists, it is more common to use 'irrational' to mean rationally imper-
fect. To be epistemically 'irrational', in their sense, is to deviate from epistemic
ideals.
Now, whether or not we call it 'irrational', forgetting-losing information-
deviates from our epistemic ideals. Compare it with other epistemic ideals:
Deductive closure: if an agent believes A and A F- B, then the agent should believe
B.
10 There are complaints against Conditionalization that have nothing to do with forgetting: for example,
that it only allows update when our evidence provides us with credence 1 in some new proposition
(unlike, e.g., Jeffrey Conditionalization), and that it doesn't allow us to lower our credence in any
proposition from 1 even in circumstances where no forgetting takes place (e.g. in Artnzenius's (2003)
Shangri-La example). But neither of these objections extends to Diachronic Evidentialism; so these
considerations simply invite us to find a suitable diachronic replacement for Conditionalization.
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Because of our cognitive limitations-for example, the fact that we can't believe
all mathematical truths-actual agents' beliefs are never actually closed under de-
duction.
Probabilism creates similar problems:
Probabilism. Our credences must form a probability function.
This entails that we must, e.g., have credence 1 in all necessary truths. It also entails
that we must have infinitely precise credences: that there be a difference between
having credence .2 and credence .20000000000001. But because of our cognitive
limitations (we are finite beings!), actual agents never actually have infinitely pre-
cise credences.
It should be a familiar point, then, that because of our cognitive limitations,
no actual agents are epistemically ideal. And there's no obvious reason to treat
forgetting any differently. Actual agents' forgetfulness is just another cognitive
limitation that stands in the way of epistemic ideality.
3.2 Epistemic ought implies can?
Now, one might object: so much the worse for any of these norms! Surely we're
not blameworthy for beliefs that result from our cognitive limitations. If you can't
satisfy the norm, then the norm doesn't apply to you. (After all, ought implies can.)
But this is simply false. Our friend in his tinfoil hat can't make himself stop
overtly believing contradictions. That doesn't make him epistemically ideal. It is a
commonplace in epistemology that sometimes a person can be irrational even when
he is 'doing the best he can'.
Even if the epistemic ought-implies-can argument were successful against ide-
als like deductive closure, probabilism, or precise credences, it's not clear how it
is supposed to apply to forgetting. After all, a norm against forgetting would say:
if you're in a certain kind of state, you should continue to be in that state. In the
other cases, no actual agents can be in the relevant state in the first place. So it's
not as though it's psychologically or physically impossible for you to be in the rec-
ommended belief state. It's just that you can't always make yourself remember
something.
But in epistemology ought 0 doesn't imply can make yourself 0. It's not as
though you can simply make yourself believe anything. (Try believing that I am a
goat!) Beliefs are not under our immediate voluntary control." And so if there's
1 We can take actions to induce beliefs, e.g. gathering evidence, or take actions to slowly indoctrinate
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any sense in which ought-implies-can in epistemology-which is doubtful-it does
not apply in the case of forgetting.
This point generalizes to any argument for time-slice internalism that appeals
to the idea that we cannot be responsible or blameworthy for believing in accor-
dance with past evidence that we no longer have immediate access to. Epistemic
rationality has nothing to do with responsibility or blameworthiness.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for the time-slice internalist is to justify their
view in some way that doesn't appeal to some misguided epistemic ought-implies-
can or epistemic ought-implies-responsible principle.' 2
3.3 Relative rationality
One fear we might have about accepting epistemic principles that ordinary agents
can't perfectly realize is that we would then have to accept that the norms of ra-
tionality are, in some sense, only for ideal agents; they don't apply to any actual
agents.
But that's rather like saying that if you're not ideally law-abiding-you've al-
ready gotten a speeding ticket; there's nothing you can do to change that fact-then
traffic laws no longer apply to you. Suppose the traffic laws say:
1. Don't get speeding tickets;
2. If you get speeding tickets, pay the speeding tickets;
3. If you don't pay your speeding tickets, go to your court hearing;
4. ...
Then this set of legal norms generates different 'levels' of law-abidingness. 'Ideal
law-abidingness' amounts to obeying all of these (where everything after 1 you
satisfy trivially by virtue of satisfying 1). Still, if you can't obey all of the laws,
you're legally required to obey 2, 3, ... ; and if you can't obey 2, then you're
legally required to obey 3, etc.. What the traffic laws require of you in particular
circumstances is relativized to what you are capable of. Still, though, if you are not
capable of satisfying all of the laws, then you are not ideally law-abiding.
We can represent the norms of rationality as having a similar structure:
ourselves over time. But generally speaking, we cannot believe something merely by trying.
12 In a 2012 AAP talk (no manuscript currently exists), Wolfgang Schwarz argued, similarly, that the
motivtion for rejecting diachronic norms derives from the idea that they cannot be action-guiding,
and this turns on an illicit conflation of the practical with the epistemic.
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1. Be diachronically and synchronically coherent.
2. If you can't be both, be synchronically coherent.
3. ... etc.
So, like law-abidingness, we can think of rationality as relative-in particular, rel-
ative to our cognitive limitations. Ideal rationality is a special case of relative ratio-
nality: it is the case where there are no limitations.
3.4 Rationality vs. epistemic ideality?
I have emphasized that there's a clear sense in which the subject who violates di-
achronic norms is doing worse, epistemically, than the subject who doesn't. But
the time-slice internalist might object: the person who happens to know less is also
doing worse, epistemically, than a person who knows more. But that doesn't mean
that the person who knows less is irrational. So, the time-slice internalist might
conclude, not all epistemic norms are norms of rationality.
There is a natural way of drawing a distinction between norms of epistemic
rationality vs. other epistemic norms. In the practical realm we sometimes dis-
tinguish 'objective' and 'subjective' norms. By analogy, we might consider it an
objective epistemic norm that we should believe all true propositions and disbe-
lieve all false propositions, in the same way that according to the utilitarian, it is an
objective norm that we should maximize utility. And conversely, we might think of
norms of rationality as including only the subjective norms. Where do diachronic
norms fall on this divide? Which of the epistemic norms are norms of epistemic
rationality?
As a working hypothesis, here is my suggestion: we should think of the norms
of epistemic rationality as those that characterize the states of the agent and not
her environment. One of the ways of cashing this out: the epistemic norms are the
constraints that characterize the epistemic states of the ideal information gatherer.13
The ideal information gatherer is non-omniscient; none of her beliefs is guaranteed
to be true except on the basis of evidence.14
13 Schwarz defended Conditionalization with this analogy: suppose we want to build a robot to gather
information for us in whatever environment he ends up in. We have the option of programming it to
obey diachronic evidentialism. Should we? It seems fairly obvious that we should: then the robot
will not lose information, and so will end up with more information.
14This is, again, a working hypothesis. But there is another answer that I'm sympathetic to. There's
a few suggested in semantics, but separable from linguistic considerations, that there is no real sub-
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Epistemic rationality involves having beliefs that approximate the truth as much
as possible, given our non-omniscience. On this view, though, there's no reason to
think of diachronic norms as somehow external to rationality. Retaining informa-
tion will, by and large, help you keep your belief state more accurate.
4 Rational information loss
4.1 Losing information to gain information
Now, it can't be that losing information necessarily makes your beliefs less accu-
rate. For example: suppose that, by chance, you happen to forget only mislead-
ing evidence. Then losing information actually makes your beliefs more accurate.
Rather, retaining information makes it more likely that your credences will be more
accurate, roughly speaking. It increases the expected accuracy of your credences.
(I will say more about this in section 1.)
Now, conditionalizing on new information is an example of pure information
gain. And forgetting and discarding evidence are examples of pure information
loss. But what should we say about mixed cases?
We can define an information trade-off as a case where you gain some in-
formation at the cost of losing some other information. If taking an information
trade-off can be rational, then some forms of diachronic norm are false. For ex-
ample, Conditionalization is false: rational informational trade-offs would require
rational information loss. Christensen (2000) uses an example with the following
structure to argue against the view that there are diachronic epistemic norms:
Example #4
Suppose you know that someone knows more than you about some
topic. You know some things she doesn't know, but on the whole she's
more informed on the topic. It would be gauche to ask her about the
topic. Luckily, you have the option of using a credence downloader to
replace your credences on the topic with hers. Is it permissible for you
to do so?
Christensen invites us to judge that it is indeed permissible.
jective/objective divide. There are simply grades of more or less subjective norm. Likewise, it might
be that there's ultimately no defensible line to be drawn between subjective and objective epistemic
norms. Diachronic norms are more 'subjective' than the norm of truth, but more 'objective' than
some synchronic norms (like probabilism), which are in turn more 'objective' than other synchronic
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Now, it should be clear that this is at best an argument against some diachronic
norms, not against diachronic rationality in general. But one interesting fact about
this case is that if you take the trade-off, you violate Conditionalization-but you
also increase the expected accuracy of your credences. So, if epistemic rationality
consists in maximizing expected accuracy, then Conditionalization can't be a norm
of epistemic rationality.
Now, there are two possible objections one could make against Conditionaliza-
tion on the basis of an example like this.
Objection #1. Taking the trade-off maximizes expected accuracy, so you're ratio-
nally required to violate Conditionalization.
This shouldn't trouble the proponent of Conditionalization. The norms of epis-
temic rationality govern only epistemic states, not actions like using a credence
downloader. If we were rationally required to perform actions that maximize the
expected accuracy of our credal states, then we would, for example, be rationally
required to perform constant experiments, to read all of Wikipedia, etc.
Objection #2. If you do take the trade-off, your resulting epistemic state is rational.
So it must be permissible to violate Conditionalization.
This objection is more troubling for the proponent of Conditionalization. If this
objection is correct, then Conditionalization is false. At most Conditionalization
holds across periods of time where no informational trade-offs are available.
There are the two options, then, for the proponent of diachronic norms:
1. We can stick with Conditionalization and reject the claim that there are epis-
temically rational informational trade-offs. (We might concede that informa-
tional trade-offs are still pragmatically rational.)
2. Alternatively, we can adopt diachronic norms that are more liberal that Con-
ditionalization.
There's something to be said for both options and I won't defend one over the
other. There's little more to be said about the first option, though, so let's explore
the second option. But first, we should say a little bit more about what expected
accuracy is.
norms, and so on.
56
4.2 Epistemic utility theory
Epistemic utility theory formalizes the notions of the accuracy and the expected
accuracy of a credence function. The aim of epistemic utility theory is to use the
tools of decision theory, combined with an epistemic version of value, in order to
give a foundational justification for various epistemic norms.
The most widely discussed epistemic utility functions are gradational accuracy
measures. The accuracy of a credence is its nearness to the truth (by some measure).
A credence function with maximal accuracy would assign credence 1 in all truths
and credence 0 in all falsehoods. In other words, it would be omniscient.
Decision rules are adapted from decision theory, e.g. expected utility maxi-
mization. Paired with accuracy as the relevant measure of utility, we end up with
the decision rule:
Maximize Expected Accuracy: adopt the credence function that has the highest
expected accuracy, by your own lights.15
The expected accuracy of a credence function is standardly calculated as the sum
of a credence function's accuracy in each world, weighted by the probability of that
world. In symbols:
EUcr(Cr') ( Cr(wi)U(Cr",wi)
wiEY11
With the decision rule Maximize Expected Accuracy, various results can be
proven. Call a function from evidence to credence functions an 'update policy.'
Greaves & Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b) proved that from an
agent's own perspective, given the choice of all possible update policies, Condi-
tionalization alone maximizes expected accuracy. So, one might conclude hastily,
in order to be an ideal information gatherer, your credences should update by Con-
ditionalization.
But, you might ask, isn't example #4 intuitively a case where I know that some
other credences than my own maximize expected accuracy from my point of view?
In that example, I would receive an increase in expected accuracy if I updated by
some means that would involve violating Conditionalization. Does that example
conflict with the results of epistemic utility theory?
15 In (Carr, manuscripta), I call into question the idea of expected accuracy used by epistemic utility
theorists. For the purposes of addressing this objection to diachronic rationality, though, I will take
the appeal to expected accuracy at face value.
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4.3 Assessing rational trade-offs
In fact, there's no conflict between the idea that there could be rational information
trade-offs (violating Conditionalization) and the epistemic utility theoretic result
that Conditionalization is the only update policy that maximizes expected utility.
The reason: update policies are narrowly defined as functions from evidence to
particular credence functions. But it's a feature of information trade-offs that you
do not know, in advance, what credences you will adopt as a result of taking the
trade-off. (If you did, then you could update on that information directly, which
would then amount to pure information gain.) Indeed, on common assumptions, 16
it cannot be the case for any particular credence function that you can rationally
assign it higher expected accuracy than your own credence function. But if you
have the option of adopting whichever of a set of possible credence functions that
has updated on some information (information that is not otherwise accessible to
you), then that option can maximize expected accuracy from your perspective.
Let's consider a particular case of an informational trade-off, specifying some
of the details from example #4. Suppose a particular coin is either fair or biased
(with a 2 heads bias), and it will land either heads or tails. You are uncertain about
both matters. Now, you and your colleague start with the same priors:
wFH: fair, heads Cro(wFH) I
wFT: fair, tails Cro(wFT) 4
wBH: biased, heads Cro(wBH) =
wBT: biased, tails Cro(wBT) = 8
Then you learn whether the coin lands heads or tails. Your colleague learns whether
the coin is fair or biased. Both of you conditionalize on your respective evidence.
You are not permitted to know the answers to both questions.
Suppose you learn that the coin lands heads. You have a credence downloader
that will allow you to perform the informational trade-off. Is it epistemically ratio-
nal for you to give up your knowledge in order to gain your colleague's?
Applying the rule Maximize Expected Accuracy isn't straightforward. Since
we don't know what your colleague has learned, we don't know which credence
function to assess. So it's not obvious how we can even determine the expected
accuracy of your colleague's credence function.
16 Namely, that epistemic utility functions must be proper in the sense that they yield the result that any
coherent credence function maximizes expected accuracy by its own lights.
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Here is my suggestion: we can introduce a new kind of epistemic action. Call
it learning the answer to a question. Learning the answer to a question involves
taking an epistemic option when you're not in a position to know what credence
function it will result in your adopting. 17
For a question -9 (i.e. a partition over the set of epistemically possible worlds),
let Cr.9 be Cro conditionalized on whatever the true answer to Q is (that is, whichever
proposition in - is true at the world of assessment).
In our example, we can call whatever credence function your colleague has after
learning whether the coin is biased or fair Cr9BF. Note that 'Cr9BF ' is a description:
it picks out different credence functions in different worlds. Ex hypothesi, your
colleague updates on B in B-worlds and on F in F-worlds.
Now, with a concrete example in hand, and a new tool (the epistemic act of
learning the answer to a question), we can ask: should you take the trade-off? We
need to explain how to calculate the expected accuracy of Cr9BF from your point
of view:
1. Calculate the accuracy of CrB at B-worlds and CrF at F-worlds.
2. Sum the values, weighted by their probability according to CrH.
In symbols:
EUCrH (C.BF ) = ~: CrH (wi)U (CrBF
Wi EY11~
In this case, with plausible assumptions about the accuracy function U, taking the
trade-off maximizes expected accuracy. Retaining your current credences does
not. 1
17 This kind of epistemic tool isn't just for science fictional cases where you are offered information
trade-offs. We can do other things with our new epistemic acts. For example, they can be useful
in decisions over whether it would be more informative to perform one experiment or another, in
circumstances where it is impossible, or at least costly, to perform both.
18 Suppose U is the negative Brier Score. (Joyce (2009) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b) argue that only
scoring rules like the Brier Score satisfy plausible constraints on epistemic utility functions.) Where
vW (X) = 1 if X is true at w and vw(X) = 0 if X is false at w, U (p,w) -Ex c Ivw(X) - p(X 2.
EUCrH (CraF) = E CrH (wi)U (Cr9BF ,wi)
wi elf
= CrH (WBH)U (CrB,WBH) + CrH (WHF)U (CrF,WFH)
11I
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This isn't surprising. Knowing that the coin landed heads isn't particularly
informative about whether the coin is fair or biased, since it would be unsurprising
either way. On the other hand, if you had instead learned that the coin had landed
tails, then it would maximize expected accuracy to reject the trade-off. After all,
knowing that the coin landed tails gives you fairly strong evidence in support of the
coin's being fair.
So, we have a concrete case where taking an informational trade-off maximizes
expected accuracy.
4.4 Discussion
As I said before, the defender of diachronic norms had two options for responding
to an objection like this. If she continues to endorse Conditionalization, then she
must reject the claim that it's rational to accept informational trade-offs. (This
might involve rejecting the idea that we should perform those epistemic acts that
maximize expected accuracy, or it might involve rejecting the idea that taking an
information trade-off is an appropriately understood as an epistemic act.)
On the other hand, if we allow informational trade-offs as epistemic options,
then accepting trade-offs can lead to maximizing expected accuracy. And if we ac-
cept that this is rational, then we can replace Conditionalization with amore liberal
diachronic rule.
These two options provide us with different pictures of what an ideally rational
agent's credences will look like over time. On the Conditionalization picture, the
ideal rational agent's stock of information will only ever increase. But if we allow
for violations of Conditionalization in informational trade-offs, then the ideally
rational agent will in some circumstances take epistemic risks. These risks have
two salient features that distinguish them from obeying Conditionalization. First,
they involve sure loss of information; second, they may lead to decreases the agent's
expected accuracy (from the perspective of her updated credences).
EUCrH(CrH) = CrH(wi)U(CrH,wi)
WiEY1
= CrH (WBH)U (CrH,WBH) +CrH (WHF) U (CrH,WFH)
12
The expected accuracy of your colleague's credence function (CrBF) is greater than the expected
accuracy of your own credence (CrH). So if you know H, expected accuracy maximization requires
you to take the trade-off.
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Here is a candidate liberal diachronic norm (which is a variant on diachronic
evidentialism):
Liberal norm: An ideally rational agent's credences change only in order to max-
imize their expected accuracy.
Note that for cases of pure information gain, Conditionalization will still hold. Fur-
thermore, rational trade-offs arguably only occur in sci-fi cases. 19 So, in ordinary
cases, a more traditional, strict norm will still hold.
Strict norm: An ideally rational agent's credences only change in response to new
evidence.
5 Conclusion
I've argued that there is a conflict between diachronic norms of epistemic ratio-
nality and a form of epistemic internalism. I've also argued that diachronically
coherent agents are epistemically better. We should think of epistemic rationality
as providing constraints that allow us to be more informed about our environment,
whatever our environment happens to be like.
The diachronic norms I've advocated are at a middle ground between epistemic
internalism and externalism: they are sensitive to facts that are external to the time-
slice, but not necessarily external to the person. Contrast this sort of view with
process reliabilism, which is concerned with whether some belief-forming process
actually conduces toward the truth. Whether it does will depend on contingent
facts about the agent's environment. A norm like expected accuracy maximization
is concerned with whether an update method is likely to conduce toward the truth,
by the believer's own lights.
If we take the option of maintaining Conditionalization, we are also given at
a middle ground between epistemic conservatism and evidentialism. Like conser-
vatism, Conditionalization permits us to continuing to believe a proposition if we
already believe it (with certainty). In fact, Conditionalization requires it. But unlike
conservatism, Conditionalization doesn't permit continuing to believe a proposition
after the evidence for it has been forgotten. Conditionalization requires remember-
ing the evidence as well. In short, Conditionalization doesn't permit violations
diachronic evidentialism. Hence, what we're required to believe is always deter-
19 One might make the case that clutter avoidance is a more psychologically realistic version of an
informational trade-off; see (Harman, 1986).
61
mined by what our evidence supports. It's just that our evidence-what we've
learned-might escape us.
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Chapter 3. What to Expect When You're
Expecting
Epistemic utility theorists have argued that various epistemic norms can be given a
decision-theoretic justification. By combining the tools of decision theory with an
epistemic form of utility-accuracy-we can justify norms like conditionalization,
probabilism, the principal principle, and others. These arguments generally use
to one of two tools: the notion of expected accuracy and the notion of accuracy
dominance. For example: it's been argued that the reason why we should have
probabilistically coherent degrees of belief ("credences") is that it's the only way
to avoid credences that are accuracy dominated (Joyce, 1998, 2009), and the reason
why we should update by conditionalization is that doing so uniquely maximizes
expected accuracy (Greaves & Wallace, 2006; Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b).
I'll show that deriving these results requires using notions of "dominance" and
"expected utility" that are different in important respects from the dominance and
expected utility used in standard (practical) decision theory. If we use the more
familiar forms of expected utility and dominance, we can't justify the epistemic
norms that epistemic utility theory had hoped to justify. Indeed, the prescriptions
of epistemic utility theory can conflict with these norms.
I'm going to argue that the things epistemic utility theorists call "expected ac-
curacy" and "accuracy dominance" can't really be the expected accuracy or accu-
racy dominance of epistemic acts in any conventional sense. It's not clear what
they are; so far we don't have a good philosophical interpretation of these pieces
of math. Without a philosophical interpretation, they are ill-equipped to do the
epistemological work they were meant to do. For example, just telling us that
conditionalization maximizes this thing-whatever it is-doesn't explain why we
should conditionalize on our evidence. And so there are important open questions
about the foundations of epistemic utility theory.
In short, those of us who are attracted to the project of epistemic utility theory
face a dilemma. We must choose between old and new versions of norms like
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Dominance and expected utility maximization. If we choose the old, decision-
theroetic versions, then we vindicate the idea that rational belief has the aim of
accuracy-but at the cost of giving up probabilism, conditionalization, and other
plausible epistemic norms. On the other hand, if we choose the new norms, we
can avoid predicting rational violations of probabilism, conditionalization, and so
on-but at the cost of giving up the idea that epistemic rationality is a matter of
having those credences that best approximate the truth, and thereby giving up the
explanation for why we should obey these decision theoretic norms. Faced with this
choice, I argue that we should choose the second horn. But this means that before
epistemic utility theory can claim to justify epistemic norms like conditionalization
or probabilism, it needs to explain and justify the normative claims it treats as
fundamental. Otherwise, these "norms" are just uninterpreted formalism.
The plan for the paper is as follows: in section 1, I'll briefly introduce epis-
temic utility theory and its motivations. Section 2 introduces the central example
of the paper. The kinds of examples I'm interested in are cases where the truth of a
proposition is not causally or evidentially independent of the credences you adopt.
In section 3, I'll argue that with traditional decision-theoretic versions of ex-
pected utility, the norm that tells us to maximize expected epistemic utility (under-
stood as accuracy) actually conflicts with conditionalization. How, then, were epis-
temic utility theorists able to argue that conditionalization always uniquely maxi-
mizes expected accuracy? The answer: the quantity that epistemic utility theorists
have called "expected accuracy" is different in important ways from the measures
of expected utility that we see in decision theory. I call this new measure "observa-
tional expected accuracy" or "OEA."
In section 4, I show that with the traditional decision-theoretic conceptions of
expected accuracy, maximizing expected accuracy also conflicts with probabilism.
In section 5, I argue that while OEA can generate better results than more famil-
iar forms of expected accuracy (in that it preserves conditionalization and probabil-
ism), it has a cost: it doesn't have the same justification as other forms of expected
accuracy. Indeed, I argue, it isn't a measure of the expected accuracy of credal acts
at all.
Section 6 turns to accuracy dominance arguments. I argue that closely related
problems afflict them: what epistemic utility theorists have called the "dominance"
relation is very different from the dominance relation in practical decision theory.
Call this new relation "O-dominance." While the prohibition of O-dominated cre-
dences doesn't lead to conflicts with conditionalization or probabilism, it has a
cost: it gives up the intuitive explanation we had for why dominated credences are
epistemically bad.
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In section 7, I consider the bigger picture. The reason why the familiar deci-
sion theoretic notions of expected utility--causal and evidential expected utility-
and dominance generate conflicts with conditionalization and probabilism is that
they conflate the epistemological ideal of respecting the evidence with the ideal of
getting your credences close to the truth. I argue that a good philosophical inter-
pretation of observational MaxExAcc and O-Dominance would be one that made
explicit the relation between OEA-maximal or O-dominant belief and evidential
support. If we want to answer the foundational questions about epistemic utility
theory, this is where we should start.
1 Epistemic utility theory
A common way of modeling belief states is to treat beliefs as coming in degrees.
Instead of a tripartite division of belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment, we
should represent belief states with degrees of belief ("credences") in the interval
from 0 to 1, where 1 represents certain belief and 0 represents certain disbelief.
Total belief states are formally represented as functions from propositions (sets of
possible worlds) to real values in the [0, 1] interval. Credences are typically held to
be regulated by two epistemic norms: probabilism and conditionalization.
Probabilism: A rational agent's credences form a probability function: that is,
they obey the following three axioms. Where V/ is the set of all worlds
under consideration 1:
1. Nonnegativity: for all propositions A C Y, Cr(A) > 0
2. Normalization: Cr(X//) = 1
3. Finite additivity: if A and B are disjoint, then Cr(A V B) = Cr(A) +
Cr(B)
Conditionalization: let E be the strongest proposition 2 an agent learns between t
and t'. Then a rational agent's credences update such that Cr, (-) = Cr, E),
where Cr(A I B) is standardly defined as Cr(AAB)
Cr(B)
The conjunction of these two claims is called "Bayesianism."
The most familiar justifications for these norms are Dutch book arguments,
which purport to show that agents with credences that violate either probabilism or
1 Throughout I will be assuming that credence functions range over subsets of a finite set of worlds.
2 I.e. the proposition such that all other propositions learned in the relevant span of time are entailed
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conditionalization are susceptible to foreseeable exploitation. (For example, they'll
accept sets of bets that jointly guarantee a sure loss.) But many have thought that
this sort of justification is inadequate. We have good epistemic reason to have
coherent credences, but Dutch book arguments give only pragmatic reasons for
coherence.
Epistemic utility theory aims to provide non-pragmatic justifications for epis-
temic norms including probabilism and conditionalization. The basic tools of deci-
sion theory are given an epistemic flavor: the relevant sorts of "acts" are epistemic,
i.e. adopting credence functions, 3 and the relevant sort of value measured by the
utility function is epistemic value. What do epistemic utility functions look like?
The natural candidates are those utility functions that tie credences to the ideal of
truth. A credence has greater epistemic utility at a world if it's closer to the truth in
that world, i.e., if it has greater accuracy.
Joyce (1998) offers a non-pragmatic defense of probabilism. His argument ap-
peals to a decision rule that Joyce calls "Dominance." 4 A credence Cr strongly
dominates another Cr' iff the accuracy (U) of Cr is greater than the accuracy of Cr'
at every world (i.e. iff U(Cr, w) > U(Cr', w) for all w E Y). (Cr weakly dominates
Cr' iff the U(Cr, w) ;> U(Cr', w) for all w E Y with inequality in at least one case.)
The decision rule Dominance is a prohibition against adopting strongly dominated
credences. Joyce then proves that for a range of epistemic utility functions satisfy-
ing certain constraints, any credence function that violates probabilism is strongly
dominated.
Instead of Dominance, Greaves & Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew
(2010a,b) argue for Bayesian norms by appeal to the decision rule Maximize Ex-
pected (Epistemic) Utility. Greaves & Wallace use this norm to defend condition-
alization. They argue that, upon receiving new evidence, the update procedure that
uniquely maximizes expected accuracy is to conditionalize on the new evidence.
Leitgeb & Pettigrew provide expected-accuracy-based arguments for both proba-
bilism and conditionalization.
What all of these arguments have in common is that they aim to derive results
simply by plugging into the familiar decision-theoretic apparatus utility functions
by it.
3 Talk of epistemic "options" or "acts" makes it sound as though epistemic utility theory is committed
to doxastic voluntarism. But these descriptions are only meant to make the analogy with practical
decision theory explicit. The project can be thought of as a system of third-personal evaluations
rather than first-personal guides to "action," and so there's no more need for doxastic voluntarism
than anywhere else in epistemology.
4 I'll call the decision rule "Dominance" with a capital D and the relation "dominance" with a lower
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that encode what's epistemically valuable (namely, accuracy) and epistemic acts
(adopting credences).
What I'll argue in this paper is that the norms that epistemic utility theorists
have appealed to differ in surprising ways from those used in practical decision
theory. These norms use different notions of expected utility and dominance from
those used in practical decision theory. But so far, the difference hasn't been ac-
knowledged or justified. As I'll show, the differences aren't innocuous. First, they
produce very different results; different epistemic actions are sanctioned. Second,
without the clear intuitive motivations of the old norms, the new norms have no
clear motivation at all.
2 When the world isn't independent of our beliefs
One of the Bayesian norms that epistemic utility theory set out to justify was con-
ditionalization. Greaves & Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b) argue
that the norm Maximize Expected Accuracy always requires agents to conditional-
ize on any new evidence:
Maximize Expected Accuracy (MaxExAcc): rational agents have the credences
that maximize expected accuracy (from the agent's perspective).
I'm going to argue that on the most natural interpretation of this norm, it conflicts
with conditionalization.
The kind of cases where MaxExAcc conflicts with conditionalization are cases
where credal acts are not causally or evidentially independent of events in the
world.5 There are a variety of such cases:
o Your credence in a proposition can causally affect the likelihood that the
proposition is true: a belief might be self-verifying, 6 self-falsifying, 7 etc.
case d.
5 See (Greaves, manuscript), (Caie, forthcoming).
6 William James discusses cases like this as examples of practical reasons for belief: "There are then
cases where faith creates its own verification. Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save
yourself; doubt, and you shall again be right, for you shall perish" (James, 1896, 96-7).
7 The TV show Arrested Development provides one such example: an out-of-work actor auditioning
for the role of a frightened inmate is more likely to get the role if he believes he won't (because he'll
exhibit genuine fear) and less likely to get the role if he believes he will (because he'll fail to exhibit
genuine fear).
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o Your credence in a proposition can also causally affect the likelihood that
other propositions are true. 8
o Your lower-order credences determine the accuracy of your higher-order cre-
dences.
o Similarly for other mental states: your credences about what you will do are
at least not evidentially independent of whether they're true.9
o Your credences are at least not evidentially independent of others' credences,
including their credences about your credences, e.g., in communication.
o Similarly, your credences are not evidentially independent of other facts
about the world, e.g. others' actions when you believe you'll command them.
o Your credences in certain propositions can logically determine whether those
propositions are true.10
o Your credences may determine the likelihood of certain kinds of social facts:
for example, if I'm The Trendsetter and I believe something is cool, that can
make it the case that it is cool (constitutively, rather than causally).
And so on. In short: which world you're in is partly dependent on your epistemic
acts. And so we need to take into account this kind of dependence in epistemic
utility theory.
First, let's examine the effects of this kind of dependence on the standard ma-
chinery of epistemic utility theory. I will be focusing on examples of the first
8 See Berker (2013) for examples and discussion.
9 Typically you believe you'll do what you intend to do; this belief is, on some views, constitutive of
the intention.
10 For example, in the case of certain self-referential beliefs: the proposition I believe this proposition
is true is true just in case I believe that proposition; by believing it I make it true. For a discussion of
epistemic rationality and self-referential attitudes of this sort, see (Caie, 2012) and (Caie, forthcom-
ing). Caie (forthcoming) focuses on Joyce's dominance argument for probabilism. He argues that
Joyce ignores the fact that dominance reasoning is not valid in cases where acts are not independent
of the states of the world. Caie endorses the move to some form of causal or evidential epistemic deci-
sion theory. In section 3 of this paper, I explain why both causal and evidential versions of epistemic
decision theory lead to bad (anti-evidentialist) results precisely in cases where the states are not inde-
pendent of credal acts. In my view, then, Caie succeeds in showing that dominance arguments (on the
traditional decision-theoretic version of dominance) conflict with probabilism. But rather than casting
doubt on probabilism, I think this impugns dominance arguments, for reasons I'll explain in section 6.
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and second kind."1 In the following example, an agent's credence in a proposi-
tion causes that proposition to be more or less likely to be true. I'll return to this
example throughout this paper.
Example #1
Suppose your (perfectly reliable) yoga teacher has informed you that
the only thing that could inhibit your ability to do a handstand is self-
doubt, which can make you unstable or even hamper your ability to
kick up into the upside-down position. The more confident you are
that you will manage to do a handstand, the more likely it is that you
will, and vice versa.
Let's make things more precise: H is the proposition that you'll suc-
cessfully do a handstand at t3. Your yoga teacher has informed you
that for all n, Cr1 (H) = n at t1 will make it the case that Ch2 (H) = n
at the next moment, t2 , and that this will remain the chance of H up to
t3 , when you either do or don't do a successful handstand. We'll call
the information she's given you: "Cr(H) = Ch(H)," where "Cr" and
"Ch" nonrigidly pick out, respectively, whichever credence function
you adopt at a world and the chances at that world.
Suppose that in the actual world, your prior Cro is such that before
learning Cr(H) = Ch(H), your conditional credence in H given that
information is .5:
Cro(H I Cr(H) = Ch(H)) =.5
And let's assume for the moment that this is a rational credence to have. After all,
the result that conditionalization always uniquely maximizes expected accuracy is
supposed to hold for any probabilistic priors. So if there's is a divergence between
Examples of the first and second kind are central to Berker's (2013) argument against various forms
of epistemic consequentialism, such as reliabilism. Suppose an agent's believing that she will recover
from a particular illness makes it the case that she will recover from the illness, but she has evidence
that 80% of people with this illness do not recover. Is it epistemically required for her to believe that
she will recover from the illness, given that doing so is conducive to having true belief? Intuitively
not. The focus of Berker's argument is various forms of objective epistemic consequentialism. Berker
doesn't direct his argument explicitly toward epistemic utility theory, which at first glance seems to
be a form of subjective epistemic consequentialism. As we'll see, constructing examples of causal
dependence between belief and truth for epistemic utility opens up foundational questions about what
sort of project epistemic utility theory is really engaged in, and whether it is genuinely a form of
subjective epistemic consequentialism.
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conditionalization and MaxExAcc, then it doesn't matter whether these priors are
rational.
What credence is rational for you to adopt upon learning Cr(H) = Ch(H)?1
Conditionalization, of course, says that your updated credence should be .5. The
question is, what do MaxExAcc and Dominance say? We'll turn to MaxExAcc first
and return to Dominance in section 6.
3 Conditionalization and expected accuracy
3.1 Two kinds of decision theory
In order to know what MaxExAcc recommends, we need to specify what the rule
says. MaxExAcc is a special case of a decision-theoretic rule, Maximize Expected
Utility, paired with a particular form of utility: accuracy. There are two compet-
ing forms that the rule Maximize Expected Utility most commonly takes in deci-
sion theory: Maximize Causal Expected Utility and Maximize Evidential Expected
Utility. As we will see, both of these rules are different in interesting ways from
the decision rule used in epistemic utility theory, and as a result they make differ-
ent predictions from the decision rules epistemic utility theorists use. But because
epistemic utility theorists have not discussed this difference, it's helpful to see what
would happen if we simply took traditional practical decision theory and fed into it
an epistemic utility function.
The causal expected utility of an act is a measure of the value you can expect
to result from taking that act. Here's a natural way of calculating causal expected
utility (from Lewis 1981): we partition the space of possibilities into a set of so-
called dependency hypotheses. A dependency hypothesis is a maximally specific
proposition about how facts about the world causally depend on the agent's present
acts. The agent might be uncertain about what effects her acts can have, and so there
may be many epistemically possible dependency hypotheses. The causal expected
utility is the weighted average of the value of each possible causal outcome of the
act, weighted by the probability of the dependency hypothesis where the act causes
that outcome. Formally, the causal expected utility is calculated as follows: where
each ki is a possible dependency hypothesis, CEU(a) = EY Cr(ki)U(ki A a).
12This example has a confounding factor: that it's desirable to be able to do a handstand. This makes
the idea that one should have credence 1 in H appealing from a pragmatic perspective. Indeed, James
(1896) discusses examples of this sort of belief efficacy as a way of arguing that there can be practical
reasons for belief. There are (slightly less realistic) examples without this confounding factor: for
example, suppose your beliefs determine whether some freckle will appear on your right arm rather
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The evidential expected utility of an act differs from its causal expected util-
ity in roughly this way: it doesn't distinguish between cases where your acts are
likely to cause a certain outcome and cases where your acts merely correlate with
outcomes (perhaps because, e.g., they have a common cause, or perhaps just by
chance). The evidential expected utility of an outcome is calculated as follows:
where each si is a possible state of the world (such that the set of states forms a
partition), EEU(a) = E Cr(si I a)U(si A a).
There are other forms of decision theory, but these two are the most familiar
forms and I'll focus on them in the remaining discussion.
3.2 Causal expected accuracy
Returning to our example: for simplicity's sake, let's suppose once you've learned
that your credence in H determines the chance of H such that Cr(H) = Ch(H),
there are only three options for which credence function to adopt 13:
Cra(H) = 1
Crb (H) = .5
Cre(H) = 0
We'll assume that the only credence functions you can adopt are probability
functions that give credence 1 to Cr(H) = Ch(H). So once we stipulate that the only
propositions these credence functions are defined over are H, propositions con-
cerning which credence function you have, propositions concerning which chance
function obtains, and the Boolean closure of all of them, then this is all we need to
fully specify each credence function.
In our example, then, we only have to consider two dependency hypotheses,
than your left, or determine whether it'll rain on some uninhabited planet.
13 I'll leave it as an exercise to the skeptical reader to fill in the remaining options Cr(H) c (0,.5) U
(.5, 1); these other options won't make any difference to my point.
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which differ only in whether H would be true if you were to adopt Crb: 14
k1 : you adopt Cra n-* (Ch(H) = 1 and H)
you adopt Crb o- (Ch(H) = .5 and H)
you adopt Crc o-+ (Ch(H) = 0 and H)
k2: you adopt Cra o-* (Ch(H) = 1 and H)
you adopt Crb o-+ (Ch(H) = .5 and H)
you adopt Crc o-+ (Ch(H) = 0 and H)
The reason we only have these two is that we're including the information that
Cr(H) = Ch(H). Other dependency hypotheses where, e.g., Cra o-+ H are all au-
tomatically given probability zero, and so we don't have to consider them.
So there are two states, k, and k2 , and three options. This gives us a partition
over epistemic possibilities; we can treat the cells of the partition as worlds. We
then calculate the accuracy of each epistemic act at all worlds where that act is
taken.
We're interested in the local inaccuracy of your credence in a particular propo-
sition.15 A local inaccuracy measure characterizes the inaccuracy of an agent's
credence in a particular proposition. A global inaccuracy measure characterizes
the inaccuracy of a total credence function. As an inaccuracy measure, we'll just
use the negative Brier score. 16 Let vw(.) be the omniscient probability function at
a world w (mapping all truths to 1 and falsehoods to 0). Then the negative Brier
score of Cr(X) at w is:
U(Cr(X),w) = (vw(X) -Cr(X )2
Now we can assign values to the worlds in our decision problem:
14 Notation: "[+" is the counterfactual connective: if .. would.... I've represented the dependency
hypotheses as including determinate facts about H. Lewis (1981), by contrast, does not distinguish
dependency hypotheses that differ only with respect to chances, and so would treat this as a case
where there's only one dependency hypothesis with positive probability. The end result is the same
in this case; I prefer the non-Lewisian variation because it allows full specification of the values of
outcomes even if they're chancy. We can't say how accurate a credence in H is at a state unless we
specify whether H is true at that state.
15 We can get away with this because in our toy example, the global inaccuracy of a credence varies
directly with the local inaccuracy of the credence in H.
16 The Brier score is widely accepted as a good inaccuracy measure; see (Joyce, 2009) and (Leitgeb
& Pettigrew, 2010a) for philosophical defenses of it. It's negative because I've been talking about
maximizing accuracy, rather than minimizing inaccuracy. Ideally accurate credences have a Brier
score of 0.
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k1 k2
Cra
Crb
Cr,
0
-. 25
0
0
-. 25
0
There's no need to calculate the causal expected accuracy because Crb is strongly
dominated. 17 So we know that Crb is impermissible, according to causal MaxEx-
Acc.
Causal MaxExAcc therefore conflicts with conditionalization. Conditionaliza-
tion requires you to adopt Crb, whereas causal MaxExAcc requires you to adopt
either Cra or Crc.
3.3 Evidential expected accuracy
Now we'll figure out what evidential MaxExAcc recommends. First, note that only
four possibilities (Wi, w2, W3, w4) have positive probability.
ChaH ChbH CheH Cha, H Chb, HChc, H
Cra,
Crb
Crc
= ruled out by chance info; / = ruled out by Ch(H) = Cr(H)
The evidential expected accuracy calculation is as follows. Notation: "Cr", in
sans serif, denotes the proposition that you adopt the credence function Cr; "w", in
1 7 By "dominated," here I mean the term in the sense used in practical decision theory: that there's some
alternative act such that for every state (that is, dependency hypothesis), the outcome of Crb is worse
than every outcome of performing that act. As we'll see in section 6, epistemic utility theorists have
used a different definition of "dominance."
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Wi 1
/ W2 \ \ W3 /
I/ / \ \ / W4
sans serif, denotes the maximally specific proposition that is only true at w.
EEA (Cra(H)) = Cro(wi I Cra)(-(vw, (H) - Cra(H))2 )
-0
EEA (Crb (H)) = Cro(w2 | Crb)(-(vw2 (H) -Crb(H)) 2 )
+Cro(w3 I Crb)(-(vW3 (H) - Crb(H))2 )
= -. 25
EEA(Crc(H)) 0
Whatever your prior credence function (Cro) is, as long as it's probabilistically
coherent and updated on Cr(H) = Ch(H), it will give Crb lower evidential expected
accuracy than Cra or Cre. And the same holds for any alternative to Cra or Crc that
assigns non-extremal values to H and H. If your credence in H is extremal, the
distance between your credence and the truth will be 0. But for any non-extremal
credence, there will be some distance between your credence and the truth.
So no matter what your prior is, evidential MaxExAcc instructs you to adopt
extremal credences. And this means that, like causal MaxExAcc, it conflicts with
conditionalization in all cases where Cro(H I Cr(H) = Ch(H)) is not extremal.
Indeed, it's no surprise that causal and evidential MaxExAcc agree in this case: the
dependency relation between H and your credences is causal as well as evidential.
3.4 Discussion
Greaves & Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b) argued that updating
by conditionalization uniquely maximizes expected accuracy, from the perspective
of any probabilistic priors. I've shown that if MaxExAcc is cashed out evidentially
or causally, this is not true.
Now, one might concede this point and be willing to give up on the general
result-but still want to embrace both conditionalization and causal or evidential
expected accuracy. And there is a fall-back position that allows one to do so in the
example I gave: by ruling nonextremal credences in H irrational. We can't get the
right results for all probabilistic credences, one might say; but we can at least get it
for the rational ones.
18Note: U(Cr, w) doesn't use the sans serif notation because U's arguments are a credence function and
a world, not a conjunction of propositions. The reason for this is that any credence function can be
paired with any world as input to U, even when Cr n w = 0 (i.e. whenever w happens to be a world
where you adopt a different credence function, or don't exist at all). The fact that the utility functions
range over such worlds is, in fact, central to the puzzle this paper discusses.
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Here are three reasons for skepticism about this strategy. First, it's intuitively
implausible that an ideally rational agent could never have good evidence for think-
ing: "I'm just the kind of person who'll be uncertain about H in circumstances
like this; and so there's no telling whether H will be true." Second, learning
Cr(H) = Ch(H) doesn't necessarily give any information in favor of or against
H. Indeed, it's perfectly symmetrical with respect to whether H is true; why would
it be irrational to have a credence like .5, which is also symmetrical about whether
H is true? Third, what's rational to believe depends on what the evidence supports.
But it would be strange to think that the evidence supported both our hypothesis H
to degree 1 and to degree 0-but nothing in between!1 9
The better conclusion to draw from these sorts of examples is that the goal of
having accurate credences is different from, and can even conflict with, the goal of
having the credences that are supported by the evidence. I'll discuss this conclusion
more in section 7.20 But this isn't the primary focus of this paper; rather, this paper
focuses on what examples like these reveal about some of the central concepts at
work in epistemic utility theory: expected accuracy and accuracy dominance. I
want to explain in more detail how they differ from the notions of expected utility
and dominance in decision theory, and to raise questions about whether the rules
derived from them have genuine normative force.
3.5 Expected accuracy in epistemic utility theory
Now, you might think I have provided a counterexample to the proofs in Greaves
& Wallace (2006) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b) that MaxExAcc entails condi-
tionalization. But I haven't. What I've shown is that if we conceive of expected
19 A natural thought: What if instead of measuring credences' utility by distance from truth, we mea-
sure them by distance from objective chance? Then whatever your credence in H is, it'll have zero
distance from the chance; all options are equally good. So we end up with a maximally permissive
recommendation for H. And maybe that's an attractive outcome in this case.
Even if you think this is the right result for our first example, there are problems for this account.
First, it still doesn't vindicate conditionalization, since it permits you to update to credences that
aren't permitted by conditionalization. Second, the solution doesn't generalize. Consider another
example: suppose you learn that whatever credence you adopt in H will make it the case that the
objective chance of H is .5 lower or higher-unless you adopt credence .79 in H, in which case
Ch(H) = .79. In these circumstances, adopting Cr(H) = .79 will maximize expected proximity to
objective chance. But this is no reason to think that the evidence supports H to degree .79.
In this paper I'll be mainly focusing on accuracy measures. But I should acknowledge that other
types of epistemic utility function could be used to generate a variety of interesting results.
20 See (Berker, 2013) and (Berker, forthcoming) for a more thorough discussion of the difference be-
tween evidential support and truth-conducivity.
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accuracy in the common decision-theoretic way-as something like causal or evi-
dential expected accuracy-then we can't get this result.
Evidential expected accuracy: EEAcr(Cr') = Eww Cr(w I Cr')U(Cr', w)
Causal expected accuracy: CEAcr (Cr') = EkEK Cr(k)U (Cr', k)
Philosophers working on epistemic utility theory, including Greaves & Wallace
and Leitgeb & Pettigrew, use a notion of expected accuracy different from either
causal or evidential expected accuracy. We'll call their inaccuracy measure "ob-
servational expected accuracy" or "OEA': it measures expected accuracy for pure
observers, whose epistemic acts have no dependency relations with facts about the
world. Where E is the set of epistemically possible worlds,
Observational expected accuracy: OEAcr(Cr') = EWEE Cr(w)U(Cr', w)
Observational MaxExAcc does recommend the same credal acts as conditionaliza-
tion.
How? OEA doesn't take into account, in its calculation of the expected accu-
racy of an epistemic act, the fact that the epistemic act is taken. That is, it doesn't
take into account any dependency relations (causal or evidential) between adopting
particular credences and what the world is like. By contrast, evidential expected ac-
curacy weights the utility of an epistemic act at different worlds by the probability
of that world conditional on your performing that epistemic act. Causal expected
accuracy uses partitions of worlds that are based on the effects your acts might
have. In both cases, the weighting on the utilities for the expectation depends on
your taking the act in the worlds considered.
The difference between OEA and either of the traditional notions of expected
utility has gone largely unnoticed. Those who have noticed this difference (Greaves,
manuscript), or a corresponding difference between dominance in decision theory
and "dominance" in epistemic utility theory (Caie, forthcoming) have argued in fa-
vor of revising epistemic utility theory from the pure observational picture to the
decision theoretic (act-sensitive) picture.2 1 But the use of OEA has wide-ranging
21 Greaves argues that evidential and causal epistemic decision theories are subject to counterexamples
based on cases discussed in practical decision theory (Newcomb-type cases for EEA; instability cases
for CEA), and expresses doubt about the prospects for epistemic utility theory, at least insofar as its
intended to justify intuitions about epistemic rationality. She does not discuss the conflict between
conditionalization and both CEA and EEA, nor probabilism's conflicts with each, and does not dis-
cuss how this might provide a motivation to stick with what I've called OEA. Greaves also does not
discuss ways in which dominance arguments in expected utility theory rely on very similar simplify-
ing assumptions.
77
effects on epistemic utility theory. 22
4 Probabilism and expected accuracy
Now I'll briefly show that, with a slightly more complicated example, the argument
in the previous section extends to probabilism. Both causal and evidential expected
22 And now, a brief excursus on how, if we switch to CEA or EEA, not only can we not get the same
conclusions from epistemic utility theory, but we can't even rely on the same premises. A standard
starting point in epistemic utility theory is to characterize epistemic utility functions. Many, including
Joyce (1998, 2009) and Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010a), aim for as much generality as possible and so
argue for weak constraints on epistemic utility functions. A constraint on epistemic utility functions
that Gibbard (2007) introduced and Joyce and Leitgeb & Pettigrew defend is that they make rational
credences immodest, in the following sense:
Immodesty: Any rational credence Cr will assign itself higher expected epistemic utility than any
other credence function.
As Joyce notes, a variety of different epistemic utility functions satisfy this desideratum. (These
epistemic utility functions are called "strictly proper" scoring rules.) This is so, though, only with
observational expected accuracy. What happens if we use evidential or causal expected accuracy?
The example we began with is an obvious case where the Brier score is compatible with modest
probabilistically coherent credences when expected accuracy is interpreted causally. (I'll leave it an
exercise to the interested reader to see why; simply consider the perspective of Crb.)
The argument involving EEA is more complicated. We can call a credence function "transparent"
iff it conforms to this:
Transparency: Cr(H) = n only if [Cr(Cr(H) = n) = 1 and for all m $ n, Cr(Cr(H) = m) = 0].
With either causal or evidential expected accuracy, only credence functions that are transparent can
maximize causal or evidential global expected accuracy. (I will explain why in section 5.3.) So,
we'll restrict ourselves to transparent credence functions. But then the EEA of all credence functions
other than one's own will be undefined. After all, EEAcr(Cr') is calculated using Cr(w I Cr'). But
since Cr must be transparent, it assigns Cr' probability zero, and so the conditional probability will
be undefined. And the EEA of your own credence function won't be higher than any other credence
function: all alternatives will have undefined EEA.
So the Brier score is not a proper scoring rule when expected accuracy is interpreted in the tra-
ditional decision-theoretic way! And in fact, any plausible accuracy measure will also be improper:
extremal credences in H will perfectly match the truth, and so their local inaccuracy will be 0 by any
measure of distance from the truth. By contrast, nonextremal credences won't perfectly match the
truth, and so their inaccuracy will be positive by any plausible inaccuracy measure.
These sorts of examples show that, combined with ordinary forms of expected utility, immodesty
isn't a good epistemic principle. While it's plausible that rational credences should assign themselves
some privileged status-for example, perhaps they should consider themselves the only rational re-
sponse to the evidence at hand, or more likely to be rational than any particular alternative-they can
sometimes rationally assign themselves lower expected accuracy than some alternative.
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accuracy maximization will, under some circumstances, require probabilistically
incoherent credences.
Example #2
Your perfectly reliable yoga teacher has informed you that at a future
time t1 , your credence in H will causally determine the chance of H
(so that at the next moment, t2, the chance is set until H does or does
not turn out to be true at 3). This time, your credence will always be
.5 greater or less than the chance:
if Cri (H) > .5, then Ch 2(H) = Cri(H) - .5, and
if CrI (H) <; .5, then Ch 2(H) = Cri(H) +.5.
So you know at to that whatever credence you adopt at t1 , it'll be far
from the objective expected accuracy (i.e. the chance-weighted expec-
tation of accuracy). The oracle then tells you that there is one excep-
tion: if your credences are such that Cri(H) = 1 and Cri(-,H) = .1,
then H is true. We'll call this credence function Cra.
Now, whether your credences are probabilistic or not, if you don't adopt Cra, then
the upper bound on your accuracy (measured here by the sum of the negative Brier
scores of Cr(H) and Cr(-,H)) is -. 25. But if you adopt Cra, then your expected
accuracy is -. 01.
Hence, the option of adopting Cra has maximum expected accuracy. But Cra is
probabilistically incoherent.
One might conclude from examples of this sort that probabilistically incoher-
ent credences are sometimes rationally required. For example, Caie (forthcoming)
argues for this conclusion: since there are circumstances where we can get our cre-
dences closer to the truth by violating probabilism, we sometimes rationally ought
to violate probabilism.
I claimed in the introduction that epistemic utility theory faces a dilemma: we
must adopt a decision theory that reflects how actions can affect how the world is
(thereby giving up conditionalization and probabilism), or else explain what OEA
is and why we should maximize it. To say that maximizing OEA ensures that our
beliefs are closer to the truth can't be right. Examples #1 and #2 are counterex-
amples: in both cases the rational agent can be certain that credences that violate
observational MaxExAcc are closer to the truth.
I interpret Greaves and Caie as accepting the first horn of the dilemma. But I
think examples like those I've discussed push in favor of assessing the prospects
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for the second horn. If rationality requires having the credences that the evidence
supports, then examples #1 and #2 show how rationality doesn't require minimizing
our credences' expected distance from the truth.
5 What is observational expected accuracy?
5.1 OEA's idealizing assumption
Maximizing OEA, we are told, is rational because it allows us to approach the ideal
of having credences that are as accurate as possible (given our limited informa-
tion). But this is only true on the assumption that an agent's belief state is always
causally or evidentially independent of the propositions the agent has beliefs about.
In section 2, I showed that far from being oddball cases, counterexamples to this
assumption are common. In these counterexamples, getting our credences as close
as possible to the truth can require choosing options that fail to maximize OEA.
Why do epistemic utility theorists rest content with this strong idealization?
One of the background presuppositions might be that the "worlds" don't dis-
tinguish epistemic acts. The world is entirely outside of us; we are causally and
evidentially inert observers. Hence there are no dependency relations between be-
liefs and the rest of the world; hence there is no reason for higher-order credences.
OEA runs into trouble as soon as we allow for credal actions to be parts of the
world, which we can have credences in.
I think this is an instance of a wider phenomenon. Sometimes philosophers
working in epistemic utility theory ignore or idealize away the fact that some of the
propositions that probability functions range over are propositions about probabil-
ities. In other words, probabilities (subjective and objective) iterate.2 3
23 For example: Joyce (2009) proposes that for any measure to be an inaccuracy measure, it must
necessarily rule that every probability function is not accuracy dominated. The reason is that he thinks
every probability function could in principle be rational by the lights of some body of evidence, in
particular evidence about chances:
[F]or any assignment of probabilities (pn) to (Xn) it seems that a believer could, in
principle, have evidence that justifies her in thinking that each Xn has p,, as its objec-
tive chance. (279)
The thought: chances form a probability function. For any probability function, you could have
evidence that entailed that the chances of each proposition were just those of that probability function.
And so, with the principal principle, the rational credences would also form a probability function.
Joyce's argument is only plausible if the believer's credence function doesn't range over chance
facts, and so we can ignore the fact that chances iterate. After all, there are probabilistically coherent
credence functions that have the property of assigning Cr(H) = n and Cr(Ch(H) = n) = 0. And these
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The big question is: once we move beyond this idealization, does epistemic
utility theory give us the right results? Any epistemic utility theory that says to
maximize expected accuracy in a way that takes into account the effect of epistemic
acts on the world (like EEA or CEA) will no longer uphold conditionalization or
probabilism. On the other hand, observational MaxExAcc does uphold condition-
alization and probabilism-but, as I'll argue, OEA isn't genuinely a measure of the
expected accuracy of credal acts.
5.2 The standard motivations for MaxExAcc don't motivate maximiz-
ing OEA
Because the differences between OEA and both CEA and EEA have been widely
ignored, the intuitive justifications that have been given for maximizing OEA have
pointed in the wrong direction. They do nothing to justify maximizing OEA and
instead motivate norms like maximizing CEA or EEA: norms that require adopting
the credences that best approximate the truth in the worlds where you have those
credences. In other words, CEA and EEA maximization, unlike OEA maximiza-
tion, are norms that require taking credal actions that can be predicted to lead to
good epistemic outcomes.
Let me list some examples of considerations intended to support maximizing
OEA that actually support maximizing CEA or EEA (or similar norms), and in
some cases are not even consistent with maximizing OEA. (As we'll see in sec-
tion 6, there's an analogous distinction between dominance in decision theory and
"dominance" in, e.g., Joyce's accuracy dominance arguments. The quotations be-
low are general enough to justify both the traditional decision theoretic interpreta-
tions of expected accuracy and of dominance.)
Here is Joyce's defense of a norm of gradational accuracy:
My position is that a rational partial believer must aim... to hold par-
tial beliefs that are gradationally accurate by adjusting the strengths of
her opinions in a way that best maximizes her degree of confidence
in truths while minimizing her degree of confidence in falsehoods.
(Joyce, 1998, 578)
The fact that one set of credences incurs a lower [inaccuracy score]
can even be perfectly justified. For example, an agent might be sure a coin is biased either heads or
tails, and so have the credence Cr(Ch(heads) = .5) = 0. The same agent might not know which bias
the coin has, and so have Cr(heads) = .5. But then it can't be the case that the believer's evidence
justifies her in thinking that the chance of every proposition X, is equal to her credence in X,. That
would entail that the chance of heads is .5 and the chance of Ch(heads) = .5 is 0. That's clearly false.
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than another at a given world should be taken to mean that, from a
purely epistemic point of view, it would be better in that world to hold
the first set of credences than to hold the second. (Joyce, 2009, 266)
Greaves & Wallace's justification for maximizing accuracy is straightforwardly in-
compatible with OEA:
[C]onditionalization will be epistemically rational if and only if it can
reasonably be expected to lead to epistemically good outcomes. (Greaves
& Wallace, 2006, 608)
[I]t is (presumably) epistemically better to have higher credences in
truths and lower credences in falsehoods. According to the cogni-
tive decision-theoretic approach, epistemic rationality consists in tak-
ing steps that can reasonably be expected to bring about epistemically
good outcomes. (Greaves & Wallace, 2006, 610)
Similarly for Gibbard:
When a person forms her credences with epistemic rationality, our hy-
pothesis will now run, it is as if she were voluntarily choosing her
credences with the pure aim of truth-that is to say, to maximize the
expected accuracy of her credence. (Gibbard, 2007, 149)
Leitgeb & Pettigrew are most naturally interpreted as endorsing a norm of having
true beliefs or having credences that approximate the truth in the worlds where you
have those beliefs:
An epistemic agent ought to approximate the truth. In other words, she
ought to minimize her inaccuracy. (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 20 1Oa, 202)
It is often said that the epistemic norms governing full beliefs are justi-
fied by the more fundamental epistemic norm Try to believe truths... We
will appeal to the more fundamental norm Approximate the truth, which
is plausibly the analogue of the fundamental norm for full beliefs stated
above. (Leitgeb & Pettigrew, 2010b, 236-7)
What these quotations have in common is that they can only naturally be in-
terpreted as saying that rational beliefs should be formed with the aim of accuracy.
But OEA does not vindicate this intuition. As we saw in the handstand example,
OEA will sometimes recommend performing credal acts that a rational agent can
be certain will leave her farther from the truth than some alternative. The same,
we'll see in section 6, is true of observational MaxExAcc's analogue, observational
Dominance. But first, let's see why OEA has this sort of result.
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5.3 The truth independent of our credences?
Now, here is a natural defense one might give of OEA. CEA and EEA generate
conflicts with conditionalization precisely because they reflect the causal and ev-
idential dependency relations (respectively) between our credences on the world.
What we should aspire to believe, this argument goes, is what's true independent
of our beliefs. And OEA allows us to measure the expected proximity of our belief
states to this independent truth.
The problem with this response is that there are a variety of ways in which,
intuitively, our beliefs do affect what it's rational for us to believe. For example, if
I know Cr(H) = Ch(H) and I know Cr(H) = .4, then I should infer Ch(H) = .4.
But that fact about chance isn't independent of my beliefs.
In other cases, it's not entirely clear to what degree rationality requires us to take
into account our own beliefs: in particular, with respect to higher-order beliefs.
To make the point simply, let's begin with a toy example, where the relevant
acts aren't pure epistemic acts. Suppose you're currently uncertain about B, the
proposition that you'll go to the beach: Cro(B) = .5. You have four options: to go
to the beach or not go to the beach, and to be certain about whether you'll go to the
beach or retain uncertainty.
B B
a,: BACr(B)=1 wi /
a2: R ACr(B) =0 W2
a3: B ACr(B) =.5 W3
a4: W ACr(B)=.5 / w4
It's clear that a, and a2-going to the beach and being certain that you are, or
not going to the beach and being certain that you aren't-involve adopting more
accurate credences than a3 and a4. Whichever of the first two options you take, it
will involve adopting a credence in B that is maximally accurate. You can know in
advance that either option will lead to greater accuracy. So they should also have
greatest expected accuracy.
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But OEA predicts that a3 and a4 will have higher expected accuracy.24 From a
decision-theoretic perspective, this is a bizarre result. It's not particularly strange
to think that it might sometimes be rational to be uncertain about whether you're at
the beach. But it is strange to think that on the supposition that you go to the beach,
a .5 credence in B has a higher expected accuracy than credence 1.
Of course, an option like B A Cr(B) = 1 isn't a pure epistemic act. But this case
can naturally be transformed into a case involving only pure epistemic acts. Using
the same example, reinterpret 'B' as designating the proposition that Cr(H) = 1.
In other words, make the case one where the options consist of pairs of a first- and
second-order credence (where the latter is about the former).
Again, it's clear that the local accuracy of the higher-order credence in a1 and
a2 is greater than the local accuracy of the higher order credence in a 3 and a4.
Whether the expected accuracy of the first-order credence is maximal or not, one
of the first two options will certainly have greater global accuracy than all of the
rest of the options. After all, they guarantee you a free true belief.
Maximizing OEA requires taking one of the latter two options. But if you per-
form one of the latter two options, you can be certain of at least one particular
alternative option that it will land you greater accuracy. If you do what OEA rec-
ommends, you are declining a free true belief! And this will be true of any credal
act that is not transparent:
Transparency: Cr(H) = n only if [Cr(Cr(H) = n) = 1 and for all m 5 n, Cr(Cr(H) =
M) = 0].
So OEA doesn't seem like it's really measuring the expected accuracy of perform-
ing credal acts at all.
Furthermore: in examples of this form, maximizing OEA can require having
Moore credences. By "Moore credences" I mean credences such that it would be
natural to say of the agent that they believe H and believe that they don't believe
H. Without taking a stand on the relation between belief and credence, we can
offer Cr(H) = 1 and Cr(I don't believe H) = 1 as a natural candidate for such
credences. If the person asserted both beliefs as a conjunction, they would assert a
Moore sentence: "H is true and I don't believe H."
It's clear of any credence function that includes Moore credences that it is less
accurate than a transparent alternative with the same first order credences. While
the person who does indeed adopt Moore credences cannot realize it, this fact is
24 The partition of states that OEA uses is {w1 , w2, W3 , W4}. Let's assume your prior is maximally
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clear from a third-person perspective: an assessor who has precisely the same in-
formation as the agent about both H and whether the agent believes H will see
that a person with Moore credences will be necessarily farther from the truth than
a person with transparent credences. Only transparent credal acts should satisfy
MaxExAcc. (This isn't to say that in order to be rational you have to have trans-
parent credences; perhaps we can have rational doubts about our own beliefs.)
The fact that maximizing OEA requires sometimes adopting Moore credences
is a bizarre result, from a decision-theoretic perspective. Part of the justification that
Joyce (2009) gives for why our credences should maximize expected accuracy by
their own lights involves an appeal to the irrationality of believing Moore sentences:
If, relative to a person's own credences, some alternative system of be-
liefs has a lower expected epistemic disutility, then, by her own estima-
tion, that system is preferable from the epistemic perspective. ... This
is a probabilistic version of Moore's paradox. Just as a rational person
cannot fully believe "X but I don't believe X," so a person cannot ra-
tionally hold a set of credences that require her to estimate that some
other set has higher epistemic utility. (277)
Joyce does not acknowledge that if you have probabilistically coherent Moore cre-
dences, then you will maximize OEA from your own perspective with any strictly
proper scoring rule. After all, there's no conflict between Moore credences and
probabilism. To avoid this problem, it isn't sufficient to limit the kinds of accuracy
measures we use as epistemic utility functions. The problem isn't in the choice of
epistemic utility functions: it's in OEA.
5.4 Expected accuracy of credal acts
In the rest of this section I'm going to try to motivate the following hypothesis:
there are necessary conditions on being the expected accuracy of a person's cre-
dences, or a credal act, that OEA doesn't satisfy. I will propose two candidate
necessary conditions for being the expected accuracy of a person's credences, or of
a credal act, and show that OEA doesn't satisfy them.
Superdominance
Say that an option a, strongly superdominates an option a2 iff all possible outcomes
of al are better than all possible outcomes of a2. In other words, a, strongly super-
uncertain about which you'll perform. Then OEA (ai) = OEA(a 2 ) = Ew -. 25(v,(B) - Cra, (B)) 2
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dominates a2 iff for all s,s' in the set of states of the world, U(s,ai) > U(s',a2 ).(aI weakly superdominates a2 iff for all s, s' in the set of states of the world,
U(s, ai) ;> U(s', a2 ) with strict inequality in at least one case.)
It seems to me pretty plausible that strongly superdominated options cannot
maximize expected utility on any reasonable conception of expected utility. I want
to suggest that this is a necessary condition for counting as a measure of expected
utility: if an option maximizes something but that option is strongly superdomi-
nated, then whatever that option maximizes is not expected utility.
Note: we wouldn't want to say the same thing about ordinary strong domi-
nance, because evidential decision theory allows that strongly dominated options
can sometimes maximize expected utility. Superdominance, on the other hand, is
something that causal and evidential expected utility can agree on.
Now, no option that maximizes CEA or EEA is strongly superdominated. If
every outcome of a1 has greater utility than every outcome of a2, then it doesn't
matter how you do a weighted average of the utilities: al will have greater ex-
pected utility than a2. But there are cases where strongly superdominated options
maximize OEA.
For example: in the handstand case, adopting credence 1 in H will give you
a Brier score of 0 (i.e. a perfect score) at all epistemically possible states of the
world. Adopting credence .5 in H will give you a Brier score strictly less than 0
at all states. But from the perspective of your priors, the OEA of credence .5 in
H is greater than the OEA of having credence 1 in H. So for these two options,
maximizing OEA requires adopting a strongly superdominated option.
Known accuracy
This example points to a second candidate necessary condition on being a measure
of expected accuracy of credal acts that OEA doesn't satisfy. If the value of a
random variable is known, then from the perspective of the knower, its expected
value should be equal to its actual value.
Consider once more the handstand example. You know in advance that if you
adopt Cr(H) = 1, the (local) accuracy your credences will have is 0. But the (local)
OEA of credence 1 in H, from your point of view, will not be 0. The only assump-
tion we need to make about the accuracy measure is that a credence in a proposition
matches the proposition's truth value iff its accuracy is 0 (i.e. perfect; its distance
from the truth is 0). Then, in examples like this, the known accuracy of a credal act
will not match its OEA.
-. 5 and OEA(a 3 ) = OEA (a4) = Ew,-.25(v,(B)-Cr3 (B)) 2 = -. 25.
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So, if this is a necessary condition on expected accuracy of a person's cre-
dences, then OEA does not tell us the expected accuracy of a person's credences.
What is OEA?
On my view, this shows that OEA isn't the expected accuracy of a person's cre-
dences, or credal acts. It stands in need of a philosophical interpretation. Without
one, it can't do the work it's been thought to do in epistemology. While it's at least
intuitive that maximizing expected accuracy might be thought of as a good thing to
do epistemically, it's not at all clear why maximizing whatever OEA is is good. So
it's hard to see how maximizing OEA, whatever it is, can justify any other epistemic
norm.
What we can say of it is this: if epistemic utility theory is meant to be bringing
decision theory to epistemology, then we should be concerned with the epistemic
value people's credences could have if they take particular credal acts. OEA isn't
concerned with people's credences or credal acts. It's concerned with credence
functions conceived as abstract objects: functions that exist at every possible world,
whether or not they characterize anyone's doxastic state at any given world.
This characterization of OEA raises a number of questions: why should we
be concerned with the closeness of an abstract object to the truth, but not with
the closeness of our own beliefs to the truth? What does it mean to assign them
epistemic value? Why should are worlds where no one takes a certain credal act
relevant to the assessment of that credal act?
As we'll see in the next section, questions of the same form carry over to Joyce's
accuracy-"dominance" argument for probabilism.
6 Problems for accuracy dominance arguments
6.1 Joyce's "dominance" argument
In the discussion of superdominance, you might have wondered: didn't Joyce
(2009) prove that, for a certain set of accuracy measures including the Brier score,
no probability functions are accuracy dominated? Strong superdominance entails
dominance, and so if probabilistically coherent credence functions are never domi-
nated, then they are never superdominated.
The relation that Joyce calls "dominance" in (Joyce 1998, 2009) is differ-
ent from the familiar notion of dominance. Let's call Joyce's version "observa-
tional dominance" or "O-dominance." Here's how he defined the relation of 0-
dominance:
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Cr [O-]dominates Cr' relative to utility function U iff U(Cr, w) > U(Cr', w)
for all w E W.
By contrast, here is the standard definition of dominance in practical decision the-
ory:
Cr strongly dominates Cr' relative to U iff U (Cr, s) > U (Cr', s) for all
s E S.
The disanalogy between the dominance and O-dominance is clear: dominance only
considers the value of an act at outcomes where that act is performed. But 0-
dominance considers the value of an act at outcomes where that act isn't performed.
But what is the value of an act at an outcome where the act isn't taken? What
does that even mean?
There's no difficulty in carrying out the mathematical procedure of applying a
scoring rule to a credence function at a world where no one adopts that credence
function. But what exactly are we measuring by doing so? It doesn't make sense to
talk of an act's value at a world where it isn't performed. Certainly, it makes sense
to talk of the closeness of a credence function, understood as a mathematical object,
to the truth values at a world where you don't take that credence function. But we
cannot interpret that as the epistemic utility of adopting that credence function at
that world, or the accuracy your credences would have if you adopted that credence
function at that world.2 5
Now, because O-dominance considers the accuracy of your epistemic acts at
worlds where you don't take them, the set of worlds under consideration for 0-
dominance is a superset of the set of worlds under consideration for dominance.
So the claim that Cr O-dominates Cr' is a stronger claim than the claim that Cr
dominates Cr'. In some cases, Cr dominates but doesn't O-dominate Cr'. And the
examples I gave in the previous section (where probabilistically coherent credence
functions were superdominated) were cases where those credence functions were
dominated, but not O-dominated.
Joyce's (1998, 2009) "dominance" argument for probabilism is an O-dominance
argument for probabilism. A premise of his argument is that it is irrational to adopt
credences that are accuracy-O-dominated. But the rationale for that equally moti-
vates the claim that it's irrational to adopt credences that are accuracy dominated.
Here is Joyce's (2009) justification for the claim that it's irrational to adopt 0-
dominated credences:
25 Note that causal decision theory (but not evidential decision theory) allows you to calculate the ex-
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[W]hen we endorse a rule as the correct measure of epistemic disutil-
ity we commit ourselves to thinking that there is something defective,
from a purely epistemic perspective, about credences that score poorly
according to that rule. Moreover, if these poor scores arise as a matter
of necessity, then the defect is one of epistemic irrationality. (267)
Joyce claims that O-Dominance is not a substantive thesis about epistemic ra-
tionality, but rather a constraint on what can be considered an epistemic utility
function. But the claim that "if poor scores arise as a matter of necessity, then
the defect is one of epistemic rationality" justifies Dominance at least as well as
O-Dominance. After all, adopting dominated credences means adopting credences
that are farther from the truth than some alternative, no matter what the rest of the
world is like. And so requiring rational credences not to be O-dominated is at the
very least substantive. What justifies the rule O-Dominance over Dominance?
If, however, we use the decision-theoretic conception of dominance, then there
will be some probabilistically coherent credence functions that are dominated. Fur-
thermore: it's not obvious that all credences that are accuracy-dominated are ir-
rational. If it's ever rationally permissible to be uncertain about what your cre-
dences are, then in those circumstances it's rationally permissible to have accuracy-
dominated credences. And, of course, there are other ways in which credal acts
affect outcomes. Suppose we look at dominance within the set of epistemically
possible worlds. In the handstand example, when you learn Cr(H) = Ch(H), some
transparent, probabilistically coherent credence functions with extremal credence
in H will dominate transparent, probabilistically coherent credence functions with
non-extremal credence in H. But in those circumstances, intuitively, nonextremal
credence in H is rationally permissible.
So: we need some justification for why choosing options that are O-dominated
would be irrational, given that choosing options that are dominated is not. But this
justification cannot be presented in terms of the aim of having accurate credences.
If your aim is accuracy, why does it matter whether your credences are only closer
to the truth than some dominating alternative credences at worlds where you don't
have those credences?
So again, we're stuck with a piece of math-the relation of O-dominance-
without a clear philosophical interpretation. Until we see what O-dominance amounts
to, such that it has more normative significance than dominance, we can't appeal to
it as a justification for probabilism or conditionalization.
pected value of an act, given that you won't take it. But that doesn't shed any light on the notion of
the value (simpliciter) of an act at a world where you don't take it.
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6.2 What this shows about epistemic utility functions
There's a further puzzling fact that's brought out by considering the role of 0-
dominance in accuracy-dominance arguments.
Suppose there are two states and two credal options:
Si S2
al  W1 W2
a2 W3 W4
Again, in ordinary dominance arguments, we just care about whether the utility
of wi is greater than that of W3 and whether the utility of w2 is greater than that of
W4. If so, at dominates a2. But in 0-dominance arguments, we assess whether the
value of al is greater than the value of a2 at all four outcomes, including, e.g., w 3 .
Why is it possible to assess al at W3 in epistemic decision theory, given that it
wouldn't be possible to do so in practical decision theory? I want to suggest the
following answer: each epistemic option generates and is assessed according to a
different epistemic utility function over worlds. Scoring rules-rules like the Brier
score-aren't sufficient to provide epistemic utility functions over worlds. They
have to be paired with credence functions to generate utilities.
As a result, different credence functions, paired with a shared scoring rule, gen-
erate different utility assignments over the same worlds. Rather than comparing
the epistemic utility of different acts according to a single, shared utility function
over worlds, we use different utility functions over worlds for each option. This
procedure is, as you might guess, very different from what we do in practical deci-
sion theory. One difference is that this procedure involves comparing two different
value functions over worlds. And so structurally, comparing different credal acts is
no different from interpersonal utility comparison or intertheoretic utility compari-
son. And this is in itself puzzling: it is part of the decision-theoretic orthodoxy that
we cannot make interpersonal or intertheoretic utility comparisons. 26
A more interesting difference can be brought out by seeing how this sort of
procedure might be used in practical decision theory. In the analogous case, we
must choose between two acts that will lead us to have different values, and then
assess all of the possible outcomes on the basis of each value system. Suppose I'm
deciding whether to take a pill that causes me to value tripping people. I know
26 See e.g. (Robbins, 1932), (Arrow, 1951/1963).
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that in the future I'll either trip people frequently or just occasionally, by accident.
Suppose also that all that matters to me is how frequently I trip people; that's the
sole determinant of value. From the perspective of the values I'll have if I take the
pill and come to value tripping people, the values of the outcomes look like this:
often rarely
pill 10 4
no pill 10 4
Why isn't the value of (no pill & often) lower? Because from the perspective of the
values I would adopt if I took the pill, I still trip people often in that outcome. (I
might not enjoy that; but the values I would have if I took the pill only care about
my tripping people, not whether I enjoy it.)
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the values I'll have if I continue to disvalue
tripping people, the values of the outcomes look like this:
often rarely
pill -10 -4
no pill -10 -4
If we cannot rationally choose O-dominated outcomes, then we conclude: things
look rosier in every outcome from the perspective of the values I'll have if I take
the pill, so I should take it. This is obviously not a sensible way of reasoning.
All the outcomes should be evaluated relative to a shared utility function that is
independent of the acts.
If we stick with this sort of decision-theoretic conception of epistemic utility
theory, then there's a natural solution. If we use a utility function that assesses
the values of credence functions only at worlds where the relevant agent has those
credences, then we can figure out which credences dominate according to a shared
utility function.
But I don't think that epistemic utility theorists should take that strategy, since
doing so leads to using decision-theoretic rules like Dominance and causal or ev-
idential MaxExAcc that conflict with conditionalization and probabilism. Instead,
I think we should clarify the notion of an epistemic utility function. We should
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think of epistemic utility functions as ranging over a different kind of formal ob-
ject. Rather than having the outcomes be propositions (sets of worlds), we can let
outcomes be sets of pairs of worlds and credence functions. Then we assess each
epistemic act at each world-credence function pair that has that act as its second
element.
While I think this strategy is necessary for both O-Dominance arguments and
observational MaxExAcc arguments, I want to note that it's quite a hoop to jump
through in order to ensure that we can assess the value of credence functions at
worlds where the relevant agents don't adopt them. And so if this is what we
should do, then we're at least owed a philosophical interpretation of why it's crucial
to assess credence functions at worlds where no one has them-and in doing so
allow e.g. Moore credences not to be accuracy dominated, in spite of the fact that
transparency generates a sure gain in accuracy. Otherwise, this is just so much
more uninterpreted formalism.
7 Accuracy and evidence
I've argued that the notions of expected accuracy and accuracy dominance that
are used in epistemic utility theory don't have a clear philosophical interpretation.
And so some important questions about the foundations of epistemic utility theory
remain open. By way of conclusion, let me discuss what I think are the main
philosophical stakes in answering these questions.
Here are two claims that are pretty plausible:
Evidence You should adopt the belief state that your evidence supports.
Accuracy What you should believe is determined by the aim of accuracy: that is,
the aim of having a belief state that's as close to the truth as possible.
These claims seem to go tidily together. It can even seem like Evidence and Ac-
curacy are two different ways of expressing the same thing. After all, the evi-
dence supports believing that H only if the evidence suggests that H is true. That's
what makes it evidential support. Some considerations might favor believing what's
false, maybe because you derive some benefit from having a false belief. But ev-
idential considerations in favor of a belief are considerations that point you in the
direction of the truth, or at least what your evidence suggests is true. If you had
perfect, complete evidence, then it would support perfectly accurate beliefs.
But these claims are not the same. There's an intuitive sense in which, in cases
like the handstand example, evidential support and promotion of accuracy simply
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come apart. Accuracy demands extremal credences in that example. Intuitively,
Evidence doesn't.
What does Evidence require in that example? It's not at all clear. Here is a
(non-exhaustive) list of some positions one might take with respect to the handstand
example:
1. Impermissivism: there's a particular credence in H that's rationally re-
quired.
2. Permissivism: more than one credence in H can be rational, as long as it's
arrived at by rational update on permissible priors.
3. Extreme permissivism: more than one credence in H is rational, and the
choice is unconstrained by your priors.
4. Gappy credences: you shouldn't have any credence at all in H.27
5. Epistemic dilemma: there are no permissible doxastic states you can adopt.
6. Belief indeterminacy: you should adopt an indeterminate doxastic state.
7. Normative indeterminacy: it's indeterminate what doxastic state you should
have.
For my part, I'm actually somewhat attracted to option 7.28 Your evidence can
only support confidence in H to the extent that it supports confidence that you'll
believe H. After all, your credence in H is the sole determinant of how likely H
is to be true. So if anyone wants to find out whether H, they must investigate how
confident you'll be in H. But how do we find out what you'll believe? We've
stipulated that you're rational (because we're trying to find out what attitude is
rational to take, and we do so by considering what attitudes rational agents take).
But wait: if you're rational, you'll be confident of H only on the grounds that the
evidence supports H. After all, rationality requires believing H only to the extent
that the evidence supports H.
So there is no independent evidential grip we can get on H. Before we can find
out what credence is rational in H, we need to find out what credence you have in
H (since this determines whether H); but before we can find out what credence you
27 Perhaps because you shouldn't take any attitude toward the proposition that you adopt this or that cre-
dence in H. Some ((Levi, 1997), (Spohn, 1977), Briggs (personal communication)) say we shouldn't,
or needn't, have credences in our own future acts-at least in the context of deliberation.
28 1 defend a similar position with respect to indeterminate evidence in (Carr, manuscriptb).
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have in H, we need to know what credence is rational in H (because you are, ex
hypothesi, rational). There doesn't seem to be an evidential basis for any credence
here. So it seems plausible to me that the norm of Evidence doesn't give any verdict
in this case whatsoever.29
I began by claiming that epistemic utility theory faces a dilemma. We have to
choose between traditional decision-theoretic rules (causal/evidential MaxExAcc;
Dominance) and observational rules (observational MaxExAcc; O-Dominance).
There are costs and benefits associated with each horn.
The benefit of the decision-theoretic rules is that they vindicate the idea that
rational belief has the aim of accuracy, and so have an intuitive rationale. Their cost
is that we'll have to give up probabilism, conditionalization, and other plausible
epistemic norms.
The benefit of observational rules is that we can retain probabilism, condition-
alization, etc. Their cost is that we'll have to give up on the idea that epistemic
rationality is a matter of pursuing the goal of accuracy-and thereby give up our
intuitive explanation for why we should obey these rules.
The second horn is more promising. But it leaves big unopened questions at
the foundations of epistemic utility theory.
o Why are worlds where an act isn't taken relevant for the assessment of the
act?
o Observational expected accuracy isn't the expected accuracy of an epistemic
act or a person's epistemic states; so what is it?
o Why is the accuracy of what OEA assesses epistemically significant, given
that the accuracy of a person's epistemic states isn't?
Until these questions are answered, the observational rules stand in need of a philo-
sophical interpretation. Before we can claim that epistemic utility theory justifies
29 Note that even if we add extra evidence-say, that a 80% of people who were in your position and
learned Cr(H) = Ch(H) ended up making H true-I think it's rational for that evidence to be screened
by Cr(H) = Ch(H), in the sense of Weatherson (manuscript). That is:
1. Cr(H 180% info) > Cr(H)
2. Cr(H 180% info ACr(H) = Ch(H)) = Cr(H I Cr(H) = Ch(H))
In the light of learning Cr(H) = Ch(H), the information about other people is neutralized. So it's not
that you have no evidence about H. It's that what evidence you have doesn't seem to make any push
toward any credence.
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epistemic norms like conditionalization or probabilism, we needs to explain and
justify the non-consequentialist norms we're treating as fundamental.
Do the observational rules respect the norm of Evidence, instead of Accuracy?
If they do, it would provide a special vindication of the research program of epis-
temic utility theory. Epistemic utility theory would be able to provide something
that other forms of epistemic consequentialism so far haven't succeeded in provid-
ing: a mathematically precise epistemological theory that codifies the fundamental
epistemic norm that we should believe what our evidence supports. The problem is
that the arguments that philosophers in epistemic utility theory have provided for
observational norms are stated in terms of the goal of accuracy promotion. And so,
if the norms associated with OEA and O-dominance make recommendations that
align with evidentialism, it's not at all clear how or why they do. I think these are
the questions we should be answering.
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